Enabling Access to Clinical Trial Data: When is Unfair Use Fair? by Kim, Daria
Chicago-Kent Journal of Intellectual Property 
Volume 14 Issue 2 Article 8 
5-1-2015 
Enabling Access to Clinical Trial Data: When is Unfair Use Fair? 
Daria Kim 
Augsburg University 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/ckjip 
 Part of the Intellectual Property Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Daria Kim, Enabling Access to Clinical Trial Data: When is Unfair Use Fair?, 14 Chi. -Kent J. Intell. Prop. 
521 (2015). 
Available at: https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/ckjip/vol14/iss2/8 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law. 
It has been accepted for inclusion in Chicago-Kent Journal of Intellectual Property by an authorized editor of 




ENABLING	  ACCESS	  TO	  CLINICAL	  TRIAL	  DATA:	  	  
WHEN	  IS	  UNFAIR	  USE	  FAIR?	  
DARIA	  KIM*	  
ABSTRACT	  
This	   inquiry	   is	  prompted	  by	   the	  unprecedented	  policy	  of	   the	  Eu-­‐
ropean	  Medicines	   Agency	   that	   enables	   the	   disclosure	   of	   clinical	   trial	  
reports	   submitted	   for	   drug	   marketing	   authorization,	   effective	   as	   of	  
January	  1,	  2015.	  It	  addresses	  the	  question	  whether	  such	  practice	  is	  in	  
compliance	  with	   the	   international	  standard	  of	  clinical	  data	  protection	  
under	  Article	  39.3	  of	   the	  TRIPS	  Agreement.	  Most	  scholarly	  and	  policy	  
debate	  regarding	  this	  provision	  analyzes	  whether	  it	  precludes	  the	  ref-­‐
erential	  use	  of	  data	  to	  facilitate	  the	  approval	  of	  a	  generic	  drug.	  Rather	  
than	  focusing	  on	  a	  particular	  use,	  this	  Article	  seeks	  to	  identify	  the	  prin-­‐
ciple	   underlying	   the	   protection	   obligation	   by	  which	   the	   legitimacy	   of	  
“use	  X”	  can	  be	  evaluated.	   In	  doing	  so,	   it	   interprets	   the	  provision	  from	  
literal,	  historical	  and	  teleological	  perspectives,	  and	  it	  analyzes	  a	  peculi-­‐
ar	  overlap	  between	   three	   legal	   regimes:	  unfair	   competition,	   trade	   se-­‐
cret,	  and	  sui	  generis	  data	  protection.	  
The	  proposed	  principle	  allows	  avoidance	  of	  situations	  where,	  due	  
to	   the	   ambiguous	   notion	   of	   unfair	   commercial	   use,	   the	   protection	   of	  
data	   under	   the	   TRIPS	   Agreement	   can	   be	   stretched	   indefinitely.	  With	  
regard	   to	   data	   disclosure	   for	   experimental	   use,	   it	   is	   argued	   that	   the	  
protection	  obligation	  under	  39.3	  TRIPS	  does	  not	  justify	  monopoly	  type	  
protection	  of	  clinical	  trial	  data,	  neither	  does	  it	  require	  the	  reservation	  
of	  experimental	  use	  exclusively	  for	  the	  data	  originator,	  even	  if	  such	  use	  
can	  have	  commercial	  benefits	  for	  competitors.	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INTRODUCTION	  
Clinical	  trials	  play	  a	  crucial	  role	  in	  evidence-­‐based	  medicine.	  Trial	  
results	  present	  unique	  knowledge	  on	  the	  effect	  of	  drugs	  on	  the	  human	  
organism.	   Companies	   that	   conduct	   clinical	   research	   with	   great	   risk,	  
effort	   and	   expenditure1	   assert	   property	   rights	   in	   the	   generated	   data	  
and	  protection	  under	  confidentiality.	  From	  the	  regulatory	  perspective,	  
clinical	   trial	   reports	   must	   attest	   to	   drug	   safety,	   quality	   and	   efficacy	  
before	  a	  health	  authority	  will	  approve	  of	  the	  drug	  for	  marketing.	  
This	  article	  addresses	  the	  unprecedented	  practice	  of	  the	  European	  
Medicines	  Agency	  (“EMA”)2	  of	  clinical	  trial	  data	  disclosure,	  effective	  as	  
of	  January	  1,	  2015.3	  While	  the	  earlier	  policy	  provided	  for	  “reactive,”	  or	  
request-­‐based,	   access	   the	   2015	   initiative	   implements	   “proactive”	   ac-­‐
cess	  to	  clinical	  reports	  for	  drugs	  approved	  for	  marketing,	  on-­‐screen	  as	  
well	  as	  in	  downloadable	  and	  searchable	  formats.4	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   1.	   	  THE	  INTERNATIONAL	  FEDERATION	  OF	  PHARMACEUTICAL	  MANUFACTURERS	  ASSOCIATIONS	  (IFPMA),	  
ENCOURAGEMENT	   OF	   NEW	   CLINICAL	   DRUG	   DEVELOPMENT:	   THE	   ROLE	   OF	   DATA	   EXCLUSIVITY	   6–7	   (2000)	  
(claiming	  that	  “[a]	  new	  drug	  costs,	  on	  average,	  $500	  million	  and	  requires	  as	  long	  as	  15	  years	  to	  
develop,	  if	  preclinical	  and	  clinical	  trial	  phases	  are	  taken	  into	  account.”).	  While	  the	  IFPMA	  does	  not	  
provide	  a	  breakdown	  of	  these	  expenditures,	  the	  European	  Commission,	  for	  instance,	  reports	  that	  
“approximately	   1.5%	   of	   the	   turnover	   of	   pharmaceutical	   companies	   were	   [sic]	   spent	   on	   basic	  
research,	  the	  remainder	  of	  R&D	  expenditures	  mainly	  concern	  clinical	  trials	  and	  tests.	  The	  biggest	  
cost	  blocks	  for	  originator	  companies	  were	  marketing	  and	  manufacturing.”	  	  EUROPEAN	  COMMISSION,	  
PHARMACEUTICAL	   SECTOR	   INQUIRY	   FINAL	   REPORT	   (2009),	  
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/sectors/pharmaceuticals/inquiry/staff_working_paper_part1.p
df	  (last	  visited	  Apr.	  28,	  2015).	  	  
	   2.	   	  The	  EMA	   is	   a	   drug	   authority	   established	  under	  Regulation	   (EC)	  No	  726/2004.	  Among	  
others,	  the	  EMA	  is	  in	  charge	  of	  the	  EU-­‐wide	  marketing	  authorization	  for	  pharmaceutical	  products	  
of	  medicinal	  products	  through	  a	  centralized	  procedure.	  	  Commission	  Regulation	  726/2004,	  2004	  
O.J.	  (L	  136)	  1.	  
	   3.	   	  Eur.	   Meds.	   Agency,	   The	   European	   Medicines	   Agency	   Policy	   on	   Publication	   of	   Clinical	  
Data	   for	   Medicinal	   Products	   for	   Human	   Use,	   EMA/240810/2013	   (Oct.	   2,	   2014),	   available	   at	  
http://www.ema.europa.eu/docs/en_GB/document_library/Other/2014/10/WC500174796.pdf;	  
Press	  Release,	  Eur.	  Meds.	  Agency,	  Publication	  of	  Clinical	  Reports:	  EMA	  Adopts	  Landmark	  Policy	  to	  
Take	   Effect	   on	   January	   1,	   2015	   (Oct.	   2,	   2014),	  
http://www.ema.europa.eu/docs/en_GB/document_library/Press_release/2014/10/WC500174
767.pdf	  (last	  visited	  Apr.	  28,	  2015).	  	  
	   4.	   	  The	  new	  initiative	  is	  a	  step	  forward	  from	  the	  EMA’s	  access	  policy	  of	  2010,	  but	  a	  “rever-­‐
sal”	  on	  the	  original	  policy	  proposal	  announced	  in	  2012	  that	  envisaged	  publication	  of	  full	  reports.	  
See	  Press	  Release,	  Association	  Internationale	  de	  la	  Mutualité	  et	  al.,	  EMA’s	  Final	  Policy	  On	  Access	  
To	   Clinical	   Data:	   Proactive	   Access	   To	   Some	   Data,	   But	   Strings	   Attached	   (Oct.	   16,	   2014)),	  
http://english.prescrire.org/Docu/DOCSEUROPE/20141016_JointStatement_EMA_NewTranspar
encyPolicy.pdf	  (last	  visited	  Apr.	  28,	  2015).	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As	   aspired	   to	   by	   the	   EMA,	   the	   publication	   of	   clinical	   trial	   data	  
“avoid[s]	  duplication	  of	  clinical	  trials,	  foster[s]	  innovation	  and	  encour-­‐
age[s]	  development	  of	  new	  medicines.”5	  
During	   public	   consultations,	   an	   exceptional	   number	   of	   contribu-­‐
tions	   were	   submitted	   featuring	   highly	   polarized	   positions.6	   Not	   sur-­‐
prisingly,	   the	   disclosure	   initiative	   was	   highly	   acclaimed	   by	   the	  
scientific	   community	   and	   strongly	   opposed	   by	   the	   biopharmaceutical	  
industry.7	   Criticism	   included	   the	   allegation	   that	   the	   EMA’s	   policy	  
“could	  .	  .	  .	  conflict	  with	  the	  EMA’s	  obligation	  under	  Article	  39(3)	  of	  the	  
WTO	  TRIPS	   Agreement	   to	   protect	   the	   data	   submitted	   for	   [marketing	  
authorization]	  purposes	  against	  unfair	  commercial	  use.”8	  
Shortly	   after	   the	   EMA	   access	   policy	   was	   announced,	   the	   U.S.	  
Chamber	  of	  Commerce	  carried	  out	  a	  study	  to	  examine	  existing	  interna-­‐
tional	   practices	   on	   regulatory	  data	  disclosure	   and	   concluded	   that	   the	  
EMA’s	   initiative	   “is	   a	   stark	   contrast	   and	   break	   from	   preceding	   EMA	  
practices,”9	   and	   “in	   a	   broader	   context	  .	  .	  .	   also	   contrasts	   starkly	   with	  
existing	  international	  practices.”10	  
In	   light	   of	   these	   observations,	   this	   article	   addresses	   the	   issue	   of	  
the	  legitimacy	  of	  disclosure	  of	  clinical	  trial	  reports	  by	  a	  drug	  authority	  
for	  experimental	  use	  under	   the	   international	  standard	  of	  clinical	  data	  
protection.	   In	   particular,	   it	   examines	   the	   compliance	   of	   such	   practice	  
with	  Article	   39.3	   of	   the	  World	  Trade	  Organization’s	   1994	  Agreement	  
on	   Trade-­‐Related	   Aspects	   of	   Intellectual	   Property	   Rights	   (“39.3	  
TRIPS”),	   which	   is	   the	   only	   binding	   obligation	   for	   protection	   of	   data	  
	  
	   5.	   	  	  Publication	   of	   Clinical	   Data,	   EUR.	   MEDS.	   AGENCY,	  
ttp://www.ema.europa.eu/ema/index.jsp?curl=pages/special_topics/general/general_content_0
00555.jsp	  (last	  visited	  Apr.	  28,	  2015).	  
	   6.	   	  Eur.	  Meds.	  Agency,	  Management	  Board	  Minutes	  of	  the	  84th	  Meeting	  of	  the	  Management	  
Board,	  EMA/MB/325638/2014	  (Jul.	  3,	  2014,)	  8,	  available	  at	  
	  
http://www.ema.europa.eu/docs/en_GB/document_library/Minutes/2014/09/WC500171976.p
df	  (last	  visited	  Apr.	  28,	  2015).	  
	   7.	   	  For	  an	  overview	  of	  submissions,	  see	  Eur.	  Meds.	  Agency,	  Publication	  and	  Access	  to	  Clini-­‐
cal	  Data:	  An	  Inclusive	  Development	  Process,	  
http://www.ema.europa.eu/ema/index.jsp?curl=pages/special_topics/general/general_content_
000556.jsp&mid=WC0b01ac0580614159	  (last	  visited	  Apr.	  28,	  2015).	  
	   8.	   	  Eur.	  Meds.	  Agency,	  Overview	  of	  Comments	  Received	  on	  ‘Publication	  and	  Access	  to	  Clinical-­‐
Trial	  Data’	  (EMA/240810/2013),	  EMA/344107/2014,	  86,	  available	  at	  
http://www.ema.europa.eu/docs/en_GB/document_library/Overview_of_comments/2014/09/
WC500174225.pdf	  (last	  visited	  Apr.	  28,	  2015).	  
	   9.	   	  U.S.	  CHAMBER	  OF	  COMMERCE	  GLOBAL	  INTELLECTUAL	  PROPERTY	  CENTER,	  HEADING	  IN	  A	  DIFFERENT	  
DIRECTION?:	   THE	   EUROPEAN	   MEDICINES	   AGENCY’S	   POLICY	   ON	   THE	   PUBLIC	   RELEASE	   OF	   CLINICAL	   TRIALS	  
DATA,	   27	   (2014),	   	   http://www.theglobalipcenter.com/wp-­‐content/uploads/2014/05/EMA-­‐
Study-­‐COMPLETE.pdf	  (last	  visited	  Apr.	  28,	  2014).	  
	   10.	   	  Id.	  at	  15.	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submitted	   for	   regulatory	   approval	   of	   pharmaceutical	   products	   under	  
international	  law.11	  
The	   provision	   mandates	   the	   WTO	   Member	   states	   to	   implement	  
two	   types	   of	   protection:	   protection	   against	   unfair	   commercial	   use	   of	  
regulatory	   data,	   and	   protection	   against	   their	   disclosure.	   The	   second	  
obligation	   envisages	   two	   conditions	   for	   exception.	   	   Clinical	   trial	   data	  
shall	  be	  protected	  against	  disclosure	  “except	  where	  necessary	   to	  pro-­‐
tect	  the	  public,”	  or	  “unless	  steps	  are	  taken	  to	  ensure	  that	  the	  data	  are	  
protected	  against	  unfair	  commercial	  use.”12	  
Both	   types	   of	   protection	   are	   conditioned	   on	   the	   notion	   of	   unfair	  
commercial	  use.	  At	  the	  outset,	  one	  may	  think	  that	  the	  experimental	  use	  
of	  data	  is	  non-­‐commercial	  and	  that	  it	  would	  not	  interfere	  with	  the	  pro-­‐
tection	   obligation	   of	   39.3	   TRIPS.	   However,	   the	   borderline	   between	  
commercial	  and	  non-­‐commercial	  use	  does	  not	  appear	  clear	  in	  the	  con-­‐
text	  of	  drug	  R&D—any	  use	  of	  data	  within	  the	  drug	  development	  can	  be	  
viewed	  as	  directed	  at	  the	  subsequent	  product	  commercialization.13	  But	  
rather	  than	  the	  commercial	  aspect,	  it	  is	  the	  notion	  of	  fairness	  that	  ulti-­‐
mately	  matters	  for	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  use.	  
From	  the	  perspective	  of	  the	  data	  originators,14	  any	  unsolicited	  and	  
unsanctioned	  use	  of	  their	  data	  shall	  be	  seen	  as	  unfair,	  and	  any	  actual	  or	  
potential	  benefit	  that	  a	  third	  party	  can	  derive	  by	  accessing	  clinical	  data	  
can	  be	  alleged	  as	  “reaping	  without	  sowing”	  or	  “riding	  on	  the	  coattails”	  
of	  the	  originator’s	  investments.	  In	  the	  scientific	  and	  technology-­‐intense	  
industries	  such	  as	  pharmaceuticals,	  R&D	  goes	  to	  the	  essence	  of	   firms’	  
competitive	   capacity.	   By	   accessing	   clinical	   trial	   reports,	   a	   competing	  
firm	  can	  gain	  competitive	  advantage	  in	  terms	  of	  strengthening	  its	  R&D	  
capacity	   and	   facilitating	   the	   developmental	   of	   potentially	   competing	  
products.15	   For	   instance,	   the	   Roche	   policy	   on	   clinical	   data-­‐sharing	  
	  
	   11.	   	  Agreement	   on	   Trade-­‐Related	   Aspects	   of	   Intellectual	   Property	   Rights.	   art.	   39,	   Apr.	   15,	  
1994,	  1869	  U.N.T.S.	  299,	  33	  I.L.M.	  1197	  [hereinafter	  TRIPS	  Agreement].	  
	   12.	   	  Id.	  
	   13.	   	  For	  instance,	  the	  issue	  whether	  the	  use	  for	  experimental	  purposes	  qualifies	  as	  fair	  use	  in	  
the	  context	  of	  drug	  development	  was	  examined	  in	  a	  WTO	  case.	  The	  decision	  is,	  however,	  of	  lim-­‐
ited	  relevance	  for	  the	  present	  discussion	  since	  it	  interpreted	  the	  fair	  use	  exception	  under	  Article	  
30	  of	  the	  TRIPS	  Agreement	  applicable	  to	  patent	  rights.	  Panel	  Report,	  Canada—Patent	  Protection	  
of	  Pharmaceutical	  Products,	  WT/DS114/R	  (Mar.	  17,	  2000).	  
	   14.	   	  The	   term	   “data	  originator”	   can	  embrace	  different	   entities	   involved	   in	   clinical	   research	  
and	  data	  generation	  including	  trial	  investigators,	  researchers,	  sponsors,	  and	  drug	  companies.	  By	  
data	  originators,	  this	  article	  refers	  to	  pharmaceutical	  companies	  that	  sponsor	  and	  arrange	  clinical	  
data	  holders	  of	  clinical	  trial	  data	  that	  are	  submitted	  to	  a	  drug	  authority	  in	  support	  of	  drug	  market-­‐
ing	  authorization.	  	  
	   15.	   	  See,	   e.g.,	   C-­‐389/13,	   Eur.	   Meds.	   Agency	   v.	   AbbVie,	   Inc.,	   http://eur-­‐lex.europa.eu/legal-­‐
content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:62013CO0389,	  ¶	  18	   (citing	  AbbVie’s	  assertion	   that	   “clinical	   study	  
reports	  describe	  the	  manner	  in	  which	  the	  AbbVie	  companies	  planned	  and	  implemented	  the	  clini-­‐
cal	  trials	  necessary	  in	  order	  to	  obtain	  the	  [marketing	  authorization]	  for	  that	  medicinal	  product	  for	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states,	   “We	   will	   protect	   our	   intellectual	   property	   rights,	   and	   we	   will	  
prevent	   others	   from	  using	   our	   data	   to	  develop	   intellectual	   properties	  
that	  interfere	  with	  our	  ability	  to	  develop	  and	  commercialize	  our	  prod-­‐
ucts.”16	  
Does	   the	   protection	   obligation	   under	   the	   TRIPS	   Agreement	   pro-­‐
vide	  grounds	   in	  support	  of	  such	  assertions?	  As	  questioned	  by	  Antony	  
Taubman,	   “Should	   the	   conception	   of	   unfairness	   be	   broadened	   to	   ac-­‐
commodate	  broader	  claims	  of	  ‘sweat	  of	  the	  brow’	  or	  Lockean	  property	  
entitlements,	  or	   should	   it	  be	  calibrated	  strictly	   to	  meet	   the	  utilitarian	  
requirements	  of	  society?”17	  
The	   imprecise	   wording	   of	   the	   provision	   risks	   a	   situation	   of	   the	  
“perpetual	   check,”	  where	   virtually	   any	   use	   of	   data	   can	   potentially	   be	  
subject	  to	  a	  violation	  claim.	  Policy	  and	  scholarly	  debate	  regarding	  39.3	  
TRIPS	   focused	  mostly	  on	   the	   issue	  of	  whether	   the	  provision	   requires	  
the	  WTO	  Member	   states	   to	   implement	  protection	   in	   the	   form	  of	  data	  
exclusivity,	   i.e.,	   as	   non-­‐reliance	   for	   the	   purposes	   of	   establishing	   bioe-­‐
quivalence	   between	   the	   branded	   and	   generic	   products.18	   As	   for	   the	  
	  
the	   indication	  of	  Crohn’s	  disease	  and	  therefore	  provide	  a	  very	  specific	  road	  map	  for	  a	  company	  
wishing	   to	  develop	   a	  medicinal	   product	   in	   the	   very	   competitive	   field	  of	   tumour	  necrosis	   factor	  
(TNF)	  antagonists”).	  
	   16.	   	  ROCHE,	   Roche	   Global	   Policy	   on	   Sharing	   of	   Clinical	   Trials	   Data,	   1,	   http://roche-­‐
trials.com/pdf/RocheGlobalDataSharingPolicy.pdf	  (last	  visited	  Apr.	  28,	  2015)	  (emphasis	  added);	  
see	  E-­‐mail	  from	  Jane	  Leung,	  Compliance	  Oversight	  Lead,	  Pfizer	  Corporation	  Hong	  Kong	  Limited	  to	  
the	   author	   (Nov.	   24,	   2014,	   12:43	   CST)	   (on	   file	  with	   author)	   (“for	   sole	   purpose	   of	   scientific	   re-­‐
search	  can	  be	  requested	  by	  qualified	  researcher,	  and	  .	  .	  .	   	  will	  decide	  whether	  or	  not	   to	  disclose	  
data	   case	   by	   case.	   Considerations	  will	   be	  made	   according	   to	   research	   team	   composition	   of	   the	  
researcher,	  conflict	  of	  interest,	  and	  if	  it	  is	  for	  commercial	  purpose,	  etc.”).	  
	   17.	   	  See	  Antony	  Taubman,	  Unfair	  Competition	  and	  the	  Financing	  of	  Public	  Knowledge	  Goods:	  
The	  Problem	  of	  Test	  Data	  Protection,	  3	  J.	  INTELL.	  PROP.	  &	  PRACTICE	  591,	  600	  (2008).	  
	   18.	   The	   literature	   on	   this	   subject	   is	   extensive	   and	   includes	   JAYASHREE	  WATAL,	   INTELLECTUAL	  
PROPERTY	  RIGHTS	   IN	   THE	  WTO	  AND	  DEVELOPING	  COUNTRIES	   185–206	   (2001);	   CARLOS	  MARÍA	  CORREA,	  
PROTECTION	   OF	   DATA	   SUBMITTED	   FOR	   THE	   REGISTRATION	   OF	   PHARMACEUTICALS:	   IMPLEMENTING	   THE	  
STANDARDS	  OF	  THE	  TRIPS	  AGREEMENT	  (2002);	  G.	  Lee	  Skillington	  &	  Eric.	  M	  Solovy,	  The	  Protection	  of	  
Test	   and	   Other	   Data	   required	   by	   Article	   39.3	   of	   the	   TRIPs	   Agreement,	   24	   NW.	   J.	   INT’L	   L	   &	   BUS.	   1	  
(2003);	  Aaron	  Xavier	  Fellmeth,	  Secrecy,	  Monopoly,	  and	  Access	  to	  Pharmaceuticals	  in	  International	  
Trade	  Law:	  Protection	  of	  Marketing	  Approval	  Data	  under	  the	  TRIPS	  Agreement,	  45	  HARV.	  INT’L	  L.J.	  
443	   (2004);	  UNCTAD-­‐	   ICTSD,	  RESOURCE	  BOOK	  ON	  TRIPS	  AND	  DEVELOPMENT:	  AN	  AUTHORITATIVE	  AND	  
PRACTICAL	   GUIDE	   TO	   THE	   TRIPS	   AGREEMENT	   (2005),	   available	   at	  
http://www.iprsonline.org/unctadictsd/ResourceBookIndex.htm;	   Lucas	   R.	   Arrivillaga,	   An	   Inter-­‐
national	  Standard	  of	  Protection	  for	  Test	  Data	  Submitted	  to	  Authorities	  to	  Obtain	  Marketing	  Author-­‐
ization	   for	   Drugs,	   6	   J.	  WORLD	   INTELL.	   PROP.	   139	   (2003);	   Jean-­‐Frédéric	  Morin,	  Tripping	   Up	   TRIPS	  
Debates	   IP	  and	  Health	   in	  Bilateral	  Agreements,	   1	   INT.	   J.	   INTELL.	  PROP.	  MGMT.	  37	   (2006);	   SHAMNAD	  
BASHEER,	  PROTECTION	  OF	  REGULATORY	  DATA	  UNDER	  ARTICLE	  39.3	  OF	  TRIPS:	  THE	  INDIAN	  CONTEXT	  (2006),	  
available	   at	   http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=934269;	   CHARLES	   CLIFT,	   DATA	  
PROTECTION	   AND	   DATA	   EXCLUSIVITY	   IN	   PHARMACEUTICALS	   AND	   AGROCHEMICALS,	   in	   INTELLECTUAL	  
PROPERTY	  MANAGEMENT	  IN	  HEALTH	  AND	  AGRICULTURAL	  INNOVATION:	  A	  HANDBOOK	  OF	  BEST	  PRACTICES	  ch.	  
4.9	  (Anatole	  F.	  Krattiger	  et	  al.	  eds,.,	  2007);	  Jerome	  Reichman,	  Rethinking	  the	  Role	  of	  Clinical	  Trial	  
Data	   in	   International	   Intellectual	  Property	  Law:	  The	  Case	   for	  a	  Public	  Goods	  Approach,	   13	  MARQ.	  
INTELL.	  PROP.	  L.	  REV.	  1	  (2009);	  Carlos	  M.	  Correa,	  Test	  Data	  Protection:	  Rights	  Conferred	  Under	  the	  
TRIPS	   Agreement	   and	   Some	   Effects	   of	   TRIPS-­‐plus	   Standards,	   in	   THE	   LAW	   AND	   THEORY	   OF	   TRADE	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WTO	   jurisprudence,	   39.3	   TRIPS	   as	   currently	   amended	   has	   not	   been	  
interpreted.19	  
However,	   even	   if	   use	   for	   generic	   approval	  was	   either	   granted	  or	  
denied	  as	  constituting	  “unfair	  commercial	  use,”	  the	  question	  would	  still	  
remain—how	  should	  fairness	  be	  evaluated	  with	  regard	  to	  other	  possi-­‐
ble	  uses	  of	  data,	  e.g.,	  their	  use	  or	  disclosure	  for	  experimental	  purposes?	  
Meanwhile,	   the	   World	   Intellectual	   Property	   Organization	  
(“WIPO”)	  does	  consider	  the	  disclosure	  of	  regulatory	  data	  for	  research	  
purposes	  as	   constituting	  an	  act	  of	  unfair	   competition.	  While	  Article	  6	  
(4)	  of	  the	  WIPO	  Model	  Provisions	  on	  Protection	  Against	  Unfair	  Compe-­‐
tition	   essentially	   reflects	   the	   same	   obligation	   promulgated	   by	   39.3	  
TRIPS,	  Note	  6.26	  of	   the	  Model	  Provision	  states,	   “The	  act	  of	  disclosure	  
of	  [test	  data]	   is	  .	  .	  .	  considered	  an	  act	  of	  unfair	  competition.	  The	  unau-­‐
thorized	   disclosure	   may	   consist	   in	   publishing	   the	   information	   or	   in	  
passing	  it	  on	  to	  others,	  for	  example	  for	  research	  purposes.”20	  
Although	  the	  WIPO	  Model	  Provisions	  are	  not	  binding	   law,21	   their	  
authority	  for	  national	  lawmaking	  cannot	  be	  underestimated,	  especially	  
if	   the	  Provisions	  are	  viewed	  as	  an	  attempt	   to	  bring	  10bis	  of	   the	  Paris	  
Convention	   “up	   to	   contemporary	   standards	   in	   the	   field	   of	   trade	   and	  
competition.”22	  
The	  benefits	  of	  clinical	  data	  disclosure	  are	  broadly	  associated	  with	  
scientific	   advancement	  and	  healthcare	   improvements.	  Access	   to	   clini-­‐
cal	   trial	   reports	   can	   contribute	   to	   various	   research-­‐related	   activities	  
such	   as	   testing	   secondary	   hypotheses,	   developing	   new	   statistical	  
methods	  and	  designing	  future	  trials;	  allow	  additional	  scrutiny	  of	  drug	  
safety	  and	  quality;	  contribute	  to	  greater	  transparency	  and	  accountabil-­‐
ity	   of	   a	   drug	   authority;	   and	   reduce	   the	   risk	   of	   publication	   bias	  when	  
reporting	  trial	  results.23	  Clinical	  data-­‐sharing	  can	  support	  the	  emerging	  
	  
SECRECY:	  A	  HANDBOOK	  OF	  CONTEMPORARY	  RESEARCH	  568	  (Rochelle	  Cooper	  Dreyfuss	  &	  Katherine	   Jo	  
Strandburg	   eds,	   2011);	   NUNO	   PIRES	   DE	   CARVALHO,	   THE	   TRIPS	   REGIME	   OF	   PATENTS	   AND	   TEST	   DATA	  
(2014).	   Some	   positions	   on	   interpretation	   of	   data	   protection	   obligation	   are	   referenced	   in	   the	  
subsequent	  sections.	  
	   19.	   	  See	  infra	  notes	  60–66	  and	  the	  accompanying	  text.	  
	   20.	   	  WORLD	   INTELLECTUAL	   PROPERTY	   ORGANIZATION,	   MODEL	   PROVISIONS	   ON	   PROTECTION	   AGAINST	  
UNFAIR	  COMPETITION,	  60	  (1996).	  
	   21.	   	  Marcus	   Höpperger	   &	   Martin	   Senftleben,	   Protection	   Against	   Unfair	   Competition	   at	   the	  
International	  Level	  –The	  Paris	  Convention,	  the	  1996	  Model	  Provisions	  and	  the	  Current	  Work	  of	  the	  
World	   Intellectual	   Property	   Organisation,	   in	   LAW	   AGAINST	   UNFAIR	   COMPETITION.:	   TOWARDS	   A	   NEW	  
PARADIGM	  IN	  EUROPE?	  61,	  72	  (Reto	  M.	  Hilty	  et	  al.	  eds,.,	  2007).	  
	   22.	   	  FRAUKE	  HENNING-­‐BODEWIG,	  INTERNATIONAL	  HANDBOOK	  ON	  UNFAIR	  COMPETITION	  28	  (2013).	  
	   23.	   	  On	  benefits	  of	  access	  to	  clinical	  data,	  see,	  e.g.,	  Press	  Release,	  Association	  Internationale	  
de	  la	  Mutualité	  et	  al.,	  EMA’s	  New	  Policy	  on	  Access	  to	  Clinical	  Data:	  About	  to	  Privatise	  Pharmaceu-­‐
tical	   Knowledge?	   The	   Proof	   Will	   be	   in	   the	   Pudding	   (June	   24,	   2014),	  	  
http://www.en.bukopharma.de/uploads/file/Presse/pm__20140623_EMA_newpolicy.pdf	   (last	  
visited	   Apr.	   28,	   2015);	   WORLD	   HEALTH	   ORGANIZATION,	   WHO	   Statement	   on	   Public	   Disclosure	   of	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models	  in	  clinical	  research	  and	  medical	  innovation	  based	  on	  the	  open-­‐
source	  approach,	  as	  well	  as	  promote	  efficiency	  in	  resource	  allocation.	  
There	   are	   no	   binding	   requirements	   under	   international	   law	   for	  
the	  disclosure	  of	  clinical	  trial	  information.24	  However,	  trial	  results	  can	  
become	   publicly	   available	   because	   of	   the	   mandatory	   registration	   of	  
clinical	   trials	  and	  the	  subsequent	  reporting	  of	   the	  results,25	  as	  well	  as	  
by	   voluntary	   disclosure	   by	   investigators	   and	   researchers	   in	   scientific	  
publications.26	  
In	  view	  of	  the	  increasing	  calls	  for	  broader	  public	  access	  to	  clinical	  
trial	  data,27	  the	  importance	  of	  legal	  certainty	  for	  policies	  enabling	  such	  
access	  cannot	  be	  underestimated.	  At	  stake	  are	  the	  benefits	  associated	  
with	  data-­‐sharing	  for	  public	  health	  and	  medical	  innovation;	  at	  risk	  is	  a	  
	  
Clinical	   Trial	   Results,	  
http://www.who.int/ictrp/results/Draft_WHO_Statement_results_reporting_clinical_trials.pdf?ua
=1	   (last	   visited	  Feb.	   17,	   2015)	   (“The	  benefit	   of	   sharing	   research	  data	   and	   the	   facilitation	  of	   re-­‐
search	   through	  greater	  access	   to	  primary	  datasets	   is	  a	  principle	  which	  WHO	  sees	  as	   important.	  
This	   statement	   is	   not	   directed	   towards	   sharing	   of	   primary	   data.	   However	  WHO	   is	   actively	   en-­‐
gaged	  with	  multiple	   initiatives	   related	   to	  data	   sharing,	   and	   supports	   sharing	  of	  health	   research	  
datasets	   whenever	   appropriate.	   WHO	   will	   continue	   to	   engage	   with	   partners	   in	   support	   of	   an	  
enabling	  environment	  to	  allow	  data	  sharing	  to	  maximise	  the	  value	  of	  health	  research	  data.”).	  On	  
the	  problem	  of	  publication	  bias	  and	  selective	  reporting	  of	  clinical	  trial	  results,	  see	  generally	  Peter	  
C.	  Gøtzsche,	  Why	  We	  Need	  Easy	  Access	  to	  All	  Data	  from	  All	  Clinical	  Trials	  and	  How	  to	  Accomplish	  It,	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  MARCIA	  ANGELL,	  THE	  TRUTH	  ABOUT	  THE	  DRUG	  COMPANIES:	  HOW	  THEY	  DECEIVE	  US	  
AND	   WHAT	   TO	   DO	   ABOUT	   IT	   (2005);	   BEN	   GOLDACRE,	   BAD	   PHARMA:	   HOW	   DRUG	   COMPANIES	   MISLEAD	  
DOCTORS	  AND	  HARM	  PATIENTS	  (2012);	  Christopher	  W.	  Jones	  et	  al.,	  Non-­‐Publication	  of	  Large	  Random-­‐
ized	   Clinical	   Trials:	   Cross	   Sectional	   Analysis,	   347	   THE	   BMJ	   (2011),	  
http://www.bmj.com/content/347/bmj.f6104	   (last	   visted	   Apr.	   28,	   2015)	   (reporting	   that	   “[o]f	  
585	   registered	   trials,	   171	   (29%)	   remained	   unpublished.	   These	   171	   unpublished	   trials	   had	   an	  
estimated	   total	   enrollment	   of	   299[,]763	   study	   participants.	   The	   median	   time	   between	   study	  
completion	  and	  the	  final	  literature	  search	  was	  60	  months	  for	  unpublished	  trials.”).	  
	   24.	   	  For	  the	  international	  ethical	  standards	  of	  conducting	  clinical	  research	  and	  reporting	  trial	  
results,	  see	  WORLD	  MED.	  ASS’N,	  DECLARATION	  OF	  HELSINKI	  –	  ETHICAL	  PRINCIPLES	  FOR	  MEDICAL	  RESEARCH	  
INVOLVING	  HUMAN	   SUBJECTS	  DECLARATION	   OF	  HELSINKI	   ON	   ETHICAL	   PRINCIPLES	   FOR	  MEDICAL	   RESEARCH	  
INVOLVING	  HUMAN	  SUBJECTS	  ¶	  36	  (2013),	  http://www.wma.net/en/30publications/10policies/b3/	  
(last	  visted	  Apr.	  28,	  2015)	  (stipulating	  that	  “[r]esearchers	  have	  a	  duty	  to	  make	  publicly	  available	  
the	   results	   of	   their	   research	   on	   human	   subjects	   and	   are	   accountable	   for	   the	   completeness	   and	  
accuracy	  of	  their	  reports”	  and	  that	  “[n]egative	  and	  inconclusive	  as	  well	  as	  positive	  results	  must	  be	  
published	  or	  otherwise	  made	  publicly	  available”).	  	  
	   25.	   	  See,	   e.g.,	   EU	  CLINICAL	  TRIALS	  REGISTER,	   https://www.clinicaltrialsregister.eu	   (last	   visited	  
Apr.	  28,	  2015)	  (containing	  data	  on	  clinical	  trials	  conducted	  in	  the	  EU	  or	  the	  European	  Economic	  
Area	   after	   May	   1,	   2004);	   International	   Clinical	   Trials	   Registry	   Platform,	   WORLD	   HEALTH	   ORG.,	  
http://apps.who.int/trialsearch/	  (last	  visited.Apr.	  28,	  2015).	  
	   26.	   	  See,	   i.e.,The	   International	  Committee	  of	  Medical	   Journal	  Editors,	  Clinical	  Trial	  Registra-­‐
tion,	   http://www.icmje.org/recommendations/browse/publishing-­‐and-­‐editorial-­‐issues/clinical-­‐
trial-­‐registration.html	  (last	  visited	  May	  21,	  2015)	  (requiring	  and	  recommending	  that	  all	  medical	  
journal	  editors	  require	  the	  registration	  of	  clinical	  trials	  in	  public	  trials	  registries	  as	  a	  condition	  of	  
the	  publication	  of	  research	  results.).	  
	   27.	   For	   an	  overview	  of	   international	   initiatives	   for	   clinical	   data	   sharing,	   see,	   e.g.,	   Gøtzsche,	  
supra	  note	  ,23,	  at	  4.	  Recently,	  the	  World	  Health	  Organization	  conducted	  public	  consultation	  on	  the	  
WHO	  draft	  statement	  regarding	  public	  access	  to	  clinical	  trial	  results.	  Call	  for	  Public	  Consultation:	  
WHO	   Statement	   on	   Public	   Disclosure	   of	   Clinical	   Trial	   Results,	   WORLD	   HEALTH	   ORG.,	  
http://www.who.int/ictrp/results/en/	  (last	  visited	  Apr.	  28,	  2015).	  
528	   CHICAGO-­‐KENT	  JOURNAL	  OF	  INTELLECTUAL	  PROPERTY	   [Vol	  14:2	  
claim	   of	   non-­‐compliance	  with	   the	   obligation	   under	   the	   TRIPS	   Agree-­‐
ment.	  
Against	  this	  background,	  this	  article	  aims	  to	  identify	  the	  principle	  
by	  which	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  	  use	  	  can	  be	  evaluated	  under	  the	  standard	  of	  
protection	  provided	   in	  39.3	  TRIPS.	  The	  principle	   is	   formulated	  based	  
on	  three	  readings	  of	  the	  provision,	  as	  follows.	  Section	  II	  discusses	  the	  
legal	  status	  of	  clinical	  trial	  reports	  and	  defines	  the	  applicable	  standard	  
of	  protection.	  Section	  III	   identifies	  the	  limitations	  of	  literal	  interpreta-­‐
tion	   in	  giving	  a	  precise	  meaning	  of	   the	  minimum	   international	   stand-­‐
ard	  of	  data	  protection.	  Section	  IV	  provides	  a	  historical	  perspective	  on	  
the	  original	  intention	  behind	  the	  initial	  proposals	  on	  the	  protection	  of	  
undisclosed	  information	  and	  the	  polarized	  debate	  during	  TRIPS	  nego-­‐
tiations.	   Section	   V	   gives	   a	   teleological	   interpretation	   and	   derives	   the	  
principle	   of	   legitimacy	  of	   data	  use	   in	   light	   of	   the	   specific	   purposes	  of	  
39.3	  TRIPS	  and	   the	  overall	  objectives	  of	   the	  TRIPS	  Agreement	  and	   in	  
view	  of	  a	  peculiar	  overlap	  between	  three	  legal	  regimes—unfair	  compe-­‐
tition,	   trade	   secret,	   and	   sui	   generis	   data	   protection.	   Section	   VI	   con-­‐
cludes.	  
I.	  THE	  LEGAL	  STATUS	  OF	  CLINICAL	  TRIAL	  DATA	  AND	  THE	  INTERNATIONAL	  
STANDARD	  OF	  PROTECTION	  
Clinical	  trial	  reports	  submitted	  for	  drug	  approval	  comprise	  differ-­‐
ent	   species	  of	  data	   including	   trials	   results,	   the	  protocol	  detailing	   trial	  
design,	   methodology	   of	   results	   interpretation	   and	   analysis,	   various	  
types	  of	  analyses,	  and	  participant-­‐level	  data28	  
The	   research-­‐based	   industry	   regards	   test	  data	  as	  proprietary	  as-­‐
sets	   and	   claims	  protection	   under	   exclusivity—as	   “an	   independent	   in-­‐
tellectual	   property	   right	  .	  .	  .	   [that]	   provides	   the	   holder	   with	   specific	  
rights,	   namely	   that	   the	   data	   generated	   by	   the	   holder	  may	   not	   be	   re-­‐
ferred	  to	  or	  used	  by	  another	  person	  or	  company	  for	  a	  specific	  period	  of	  
time.”29	   In	   the	   views	   of	   others,	   “there	   is	   no	   protection	   by	   intellectual	  
property	  law	  on	  data	  that	  are	  gathered	  for	  research	  purposes.”30	  
	  
	   28.	   	  For	  the	  detailed	  specification	  of	  the	  structure	  and	  content	  of	  clinical	  study	  reports,	  see,	  
e.g.,	   INT’L	   CONFERENCE	  ON	  HARMONISATION	  OF	  TECHNICAL	  REQUIREMENTS	   FOR	  REGISTRATION	  OF	  PHARM.	  
FOR	  HUMAN	  USE,	   ICH	  HARMONISED	  TRIPARTITE	  GUIDELINE:	  STRUCTURE	  AND	  CONTENT	  OF	  CLINICAL	  STUDY	  
REPORTS	   (1995.),	  
http://www.ich.org/fileadmin/Public_Web_Site/ICH_Products/Guidelines/Efficacy/E3/E3_Guide
line.pdf	  (last	  visited	  Apr.	  28,	  2015).	  
	   29.	   	  IFPMA,	  supra	  note	  1,	  at	  1.	  
	   30.	   	  Iain	   Hrynaszkiewicz	   et	   al.,	   Preparing	   Raw	   Clinical	   Data	   for	   Publication:	   Guidance	   for	  
Journal	   Editors,	   Authors,	   and	   Peer	   Reviewers,	   11	   TRIALS	   9,	   12–13	   (2010),	   available	   at	  
http://www.trialsjournal.com/content/pdf/1745-­‐6215-­‐11-­‐9.pdf	  (last	  viewed	  Apr.	  28,	  2015).	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National	  laws	  can	  vary	  in	  recognizing	  substantive	  rights	  in	  differ-­‐
ent	  types	  of	  test	  data	  and	  defining	  the	  scope	  of	  such	  rights.	  Some	  data,	  
such	  as	  product	  development	  strategy	  and	  technological	  know-­‐how,31	  
can	  qualify	  for	  trade	  secret	  protection;32	  while	  others	  can	  be	  defined	  as	  
database	  and	  works	  of	  authorship	  (e.g.,	  scientific	  analyses)	  and	  thus	  be	  
protected	  under	  specific	  rights.	  
Given	  the	  heterogeneity	  of	  clinical	  trial	  data,	  it	  appears	  difficult	  to	  
identify	   the	   common	   legal	   basis	   for	   protection.	   Yet,	   in	   one	   particular	  
situation,	   clinical	   data	   can	   be	   protected	   in	   their	   entirety—i.e.,	   when	  
trial	   reports	   are	   submitted	   to	   a	   health	   authority	   for	   the	   purpose	   of	  
drug	  marketing	  approval.	  
At	  the	  international	  level,	  the	  obligation	  to	  protect	  regulatory	  data	  
is	  laid	  out	  in	  Article	  39	  of	  the	  TRIPS	  Agreement.	  The	  obligation	  is	  locat-­‐
ed	  in	  the	  section	  on	  undisclosed	  information	  and	  consists	  of	  three	  par-­‐
agraphs.	   The	   first	   paragraph	   mandates	   the	   WTO	   Member	   states	   to	  
protect	   undisclosed	   information	   effectively	   from	   unfair	   competition,	  
and	  it	  references	  the	  Paris	  Convention33	  when	  it	  states,	  “In	  the	  course	  
of	  ensuring	  effective	  protection	  against	  unfair	  competition	  as	  provided	  
in	  Article	  10bis	  of	  the	  Paris	  Convention	  (1967),	  Members	  shall	  protect	  
undisclosed	   information	   in	   accordance	   with	   paragraph	   2	   and	   data	  
submitted	   to	   governments	   or	   governmental	   agencies	   in	   accordance	  
with	  paragraph	  3.”	  
The	  second	  paragraph	  defines	  the	  criteria	  of	  eligibility	  for	  protec-­‐
tion:	  
Natural	  and	  legal	  persons	  shall	  have	  the	  possibility	  of	  preventing	  in-­‐
formation	   lawfully	  within	   their	   control	   from	  being	  disclosed	   to,	   ac-­‐
quired	   by,	   or	   used	   by	   others	   without	   their	   consent	   in	   a	   manner	  
contrary	   to	   honest	   commercial	   practices	   [Note	   10]	   so	   long	   as	   such	  
information:	  
	  
	   31.	   	  See,	  e.g.,	  Eur.	  Meds.	  Agency,	  supra	  note	  8,	  at	  27	  (asserting	  that	  “[d]uring	  the	  development	  
of	  a	  biotech	  product	  a	  substantial	  amount	  of	  data	  is	  generated	  and	  significant	  know-­‐how	  is	  devel-­‐
oped.,”	  which	  “includes	  an	  intimate	  knowledge	  about	  the	  product,	  company-­‐specific	  characterisa-­‐
tion	  of	  data,	  technological	  and	  manufacturing	  processes	  or	  computer	  codes”).	  
	   32.	   	  See,	   e.g.,	   EUROPEAN	   COMM’N,	   STUDY	   ON	   TRADE	   SECRETS	   AND	   CONFIDENTIAL	   BUSINESS	  
INFORMATION	   IN	   THE	   INTERNAL	   MARKET,	   MARKT/2011/128/D,	   122	   (2013)	   (reporting	   that	   “[i]n	  
pharmaceuticals,	  the	  most	  valuable	  secrets	  lie	  in	  marketing	  data	  and	  planning”);	  see	  also	  WESLEY	  
M.	   COHEN	   ET	   AL.,	   NAT’L	   BUREAU	   OF	   ECON.	   RESEARCH,	   PROTECTING	   THEIR	   INTELLECTUAL	   ASSETS:	  
APPROPRIABILITY	  CONDITIONS	  AND	  WHY	  U.S.	  MANUFACTURING	  FIRMS	  PATENT	  (OR	  NOT)	  (2000)	  (analyzing	  
responses	   the	   U.S.	   manufacturing	   sector	   regarding	   the	   legal	   mechanisms	   of	   appropriating	   the	  
returns	   to	  product	  and	  process	   innovation	  and	   finding	   that,	   in	   the	   case	  of	  product	   innovations,	  
drug	  companies	  perceive	  trade	  secret	  protection	  to	  be	  nearly	  as	  effective	  as	  patents,	  whereas,	  in	  
case	  of	  process	  innovation,	  secrecy	  prevails	  over	  patent	  protection).	  
	   33.	   	  Paris	   Convention	   for	   the	   Protection	   of	   Industrial	   Property,	   Mar.	   20,	   1883,	   as	   rev.	   at	  
Stockholm,	  July	  14,	  1967,	  21	  U.S.T.	  1583.,	  828	  U.N.T.S.	  305.	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(a) is	   secret	   in	   the	   sense	   that	   it	   is	  not,	   as	   a	  body	  or	   in	   the	  precise	  
configuration	  and	  assembly	  of	  its	  components,	  generally	  known	  
among	   or	   readily	   accessible	   to	   persons	  within	   the	   circles	   that	  
normally	  deal	  with	  the	  kind	  of	  information	  in	  question;	  
(b) has	  commercial	  value	  because	  it	  is	  secret;	  and	  
(c) has	  been	   subject	   to	   reasonable	   steps	  under	   the	   circumstances,	  
by	   the	  person	   lawfully	   in	  control	  of	   the	   information,	   to	  keep	   it	  
secret.	  
Note	   10:	   For	   the	   purpose	   of	   this	   provision,	   “a	  manner	   contrary	   to	  
honest	   commercial	   practices”	   shall	  mean	   at	   least	   practices	   such	   as	  
breach	  of	  contract,	  breach	  of	  confidence	  and	  inducement	  to	  breach,	  
and	  includes	  the	  acquisition	  of	  undisclosed	  information	  by	  third	  par-­‐
ties	  who	  knew,	  or	  were	  grossly	  negligent	  in	  failing	  to	  know,	  that	  such	  
practices	  were	  involved	  in	  the	  acquisition.	  
	  
The	  third	  paragraph	  stipulates	  a	  sector	  specific	  obligation	  to	  pro-­‐
tect	  data	  submitted	  for	  regulatory	  review:	  
Members,	  when	  requiring,	  as	  a	  condition	  of	  approving	  the	  marketing	  
of	  pharmaceutical	  or	  of	  agricultural	  chemical	  products	  which	  utilize	  
new	   chemical	   entities,	   the	   submission	   of	   undisclosed	   test	   or	   other	  
data,	   the	   origination	   of	   which	   involves	   a	   considerable	   effort,	   shall	  
protect	   such	  data	  against	  unfair	   commercial	  use.	   In	  addition,	  Mem-­‐
bers	  shall	  protect	  such	  data	  against	  disclosure,	  except	  where	  neces-­‐
sary	   to	  protect	   the	  public,	   or	   unless	   steps	   are	   taken	   to	   ensure	   that	  
the	  data	  are	  protected	  against	  unfair	  commercial	  use.	  
	  
While	   this	   provision	   applies	   to	   clinical	   trial	   data	   as	   lex	   specialis,	  
the	  obligation	  should	  be	  interpreted	  in	  conjunction	  with	  10bis	  of	  Paris	  
Convention	  (“10bis	  PC”),	  which	  states:	  
(1) The	  countries	  of	  the	  Union	  are	  bound	  to	  assure	  to	  nationals	  
of	  such	  countries	  effective	  protection	  against	  unfair	  compe-­‐
tition.	  
(2) Any	   act	   of	   competition	   contrary	   to	   honest	   practices	   in	   in-­‐
dustrial	   or	   commercial	  matters	   constitutes	   an	  act	   of	  unfair	  
competition.	  
(3) The	  following	  in	  particular	  shall	  be	  prohibited:	  
(i) all	   acts	  of	   such	  a	  nature	  as	   to	   create	   confusion	  by	  any	  
means	  whatever	  with	   the	  establishment,	   the	  goods,	  or	  
the	  industrial	  or	  commercial	  activities,	  of	  a	  competitor;	  
(ii) false	  allegations	  in	  the	  course	  of	  trade	  of	  such	  a	  nature	  
as	   to	  discredit	   the	  establishment,	   the	  goods,	  or	   the	   in-­‐
dustrial	  or	  commercial	  activities,	  of	  a	  competitor;	  
(iii) indications	  or	  allegations	  the	  use	  of	  which	  in	  the	  course	  
of	  trade	  is	  liable	  to	  mislead	  the	  public	  as	  to	  the	  nature,	  
the	   manufacturing	   process,	   the	   characteristics,	   the	  
suitability	   for	   their	   purpose,	   or	   the	   quantity,	   of	   the	  
goods.	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II.	  	  THE	  LITERAL	  INTERPRETATION	  OF	  THE	  DATA	  PROTECTION	  OBLIGATION	  
39.3	   TRIPS	   stipulates	   two	   types	   of	   protection	   of	   data—that	  
against	  unfair	   commercial	  use	  and	   that	   against	  disclosure.	  These	   two	  
modes	  are	  distinct,	  as	  indicated	  by	  the	  conjunction	  “[i]n	  addition,”	  and	  
are	  directed	  at	  the	  same	  subject	  matter,	  as	  emphasized	  by	  the	  demon-­‐
strative	  pronoun	  “such”	  referring	  to	  data).	  
The	  provision	  stipulates	   two	  substantive	  criteria	  of	  eligibility	   for	  
protection	  that	  apply	  cumulatively:	  (i)	  the	  data	  should	  be	  submitted	  in	  
support	  of	  pharmaceutical	  products	  that	  utilize	  new	  chemical	  entities,	  
and	  (ii)	  the	  origination	  of	  data	  should	  involve	  a	  considerable	  effort.	  
Two	  conditions	  are	  envisaged	  for	  data	  disclosure,	  namely,	  “where	  
necessary	   to	   protect	   the	   public”,	   or	  when	   “steps	   are	   taken	   to	   ensure	  
that	  the	  data	  are	  protected	  against	  unfair	  commercial	  use.”	  Under	  the	  
first	   factor,	   for	   instance,	   disclosure	  would	   be	   necessary34	   to	   allow	   an	  
external	   investigator	   to	   conduct	   an	   independent	   analysis	   if	   there	   are	  
grounds	  to	  question	  the	  accuracy	  of	  original	  clinical	  trial	  results	  attest-­‐
ing	   to	   drug	   safety	   and	   efficacy.	   Compulsory	   license	   under	   a	   health	  
emergency	  would	  also	  require	  disclosure.35	  
The	  second	  exception	   for	  disclosure	   is	   conditioned	  on	   the	  mean-­‐
ing	  of	  the	  notion	  “unfair	  commercial	  use.”	  This	  term	  is	  not	  defined	  and	  
appears	  as	  a	  metonymic	  expression	  that	   indirectly	  refers	   to	  a	  specific	  
kind	  of	  data	  use,	  supposedly	  known	  to	  the	  addressee,	  but	  preferred	  not	  
to	  be	  called	  by	  its	  actual	  name.	  
Of	   importance,	   commercial	   use	   is	   not	   outlawed	   per	   se,	   but	   only	  
when	  it	  is	  unfair.	  While	  the	  term	  “unfair”	  is	  polysemous,	  the	  reference	  
to	  10bis	  PC	  suggests	  that	  it	  should	  be	  interpreted	  in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  
commercial	  and	  industrial	  relations	  between	  competitors.	  
10bis	  PC	  is	  directed	  at	  the	  repression	  of	  unfair	  competition,	  and	  it	  
exemplifies	   the	   types	   of	   conduct	   associated	  with	   dishonest	   practices,	  
contrary	  to	  business	  ethics	  and	  fair	  dealing.	  The	  provision	  is	  structured	  
as	  a	  general	  clause	  with	  a	  catalogue	  of	  acts	  of	  unfair	  competition.	  While	  
it	  is	  clear	  that	  the	  list	  of	  unfair	  competition	  acts	  is	  non-­‐exhaustive,	  it	  is	  
unclear	   whether	   the	   scope	   of	   protection	   is	   confined	   to	   the	   semantic	  
	  
	   34.	   	  On	   the	   standard	   of	   “necessity”	   of	   disclosure,	   see	   Fellmeth,	   supra	   note	   18,	   at	   450–51	  
(noting	  that	   in	  the	  interpretation	  of	  the	  WTO	  dispute	  settlement	  panels	  the	  term	  “necessary”	  as	  
meaning	   that	   “no	   alternative	   measure	   existed”).	   Such	   requests	   are	   not	   unusual;	   see,	   e.g.,	   EUR.	  
MEDS.	  AGENCY,	  supra	  note	  5	  (reporting	  that	  “between	  November	  2010	  and	  April	  2013,	  the	  [EMA]	  
released	  over	  1.9	  million	  pages	  of	  clinical-­‐trial	  data	  in	  response	  to	  safety-­‐related	  requests”).	  
	   35.	   	  For	  a	  discussion,	  see,	  Watal,	  supra	  note	  18,	  at	  185–206.	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fields	  of	  dishonesty,	  fraud	  and	  breach,36	  and,	  if	  not,	  how	  fairness	  should	  
be	  evaluated.	  
The	  notion	  of	  “unfair”	  is	  inherently	  subjective.	  From	  the	  patient’s	  
perspective,	   the	   use	   of	   data	   that	   can	   advance	   medical	   innovation	   is	  
justified	   and	   fair.	   From	   the	   perspective	   of	   the	   data	   originators	   and	  
sponsors,	  any	  unsolicited	  and	  unsanctioned	  use	  of	  the	  data	  can	  be	  seen	  
as	  unfair.	  Any	  benefit	  that	  a	  third	  party	  can	  derive	  by	  accessing	  clinical	  
data,	  can	  be	  alleged	  as	  free-­‐riding	  on	  the	  originator’s	  efforts	  and	  assets.	  
What	  is	  clear	  from	  the	  “plain”	  language	  of	  39	  TRIPS	  is	  that	  it	  does	  
not	  mandate	  the	  protection	  of	  undisclosed	  information	  under	  property	  
rights.37	  The	  second	  paragraph	  of	   the	  provision	  avoids	  any	   indication	  
of	  the	  entitlement	  to	  legal	  protection	  (“persons	  shall	  have	  the	  possibil-­‐
ity	  of	  preventing	   information	   lawfully	  within	  their	  control”).	  The	  third	  
paragraph	  is	  silent	  on	  the	  legal	  status	  of	  an	  entity	  that	  submits	  the	  data	  
for	  regulatory	  review.	  
Beyond	  this,	  the	  interpretation	  of	  the	  content	  and	  scope	  of	  protec-­‐
tion	  under	  39.3	  TRIPS	  calls	  for	  more	  context.	  
III.	  	  THE	  LEGISLATIVE	  HISTORY	  OF	  39.3	  TRIPS	  
What	   is	   curious	   about	   the	   drafting	   history	   of	   39	   TRIPS	   is	   that,	  
while	   the	  drafting	  records	  evidence	  a	  polarized	  debate	  regarding	   test	  
	  
	   36.	   	  With	   regard	   to	   the	   problem	   of	   definition	   of	   unfair	   competition	   in	   general,	   see	  Milton	  
Handler,	  Unfair	  Competition,	  21	  IOWA	  L.	  REV.	  175,	  175	  (1936)	  (“There	  is	  probably	  no	  term	  in	  law	  
or	  economics	  which	  is	  more	  difficult	  to	  define	  than	  “unfair	  competition”.	  The	  phrase	  is	  obviously	  
more	  of	  an	  epithet	  than	  a	  word	  of	  art.	  Its	  legal	  usage	  embodies	  a	  conclusion	  rather	  than	  the	  means	  
of	  determining	  the	  legality	  of	  business	  behavior.	  Definition	  by	  illustration	  merely	  exhibits	  a	  mul-­‐
tiplicity	   of	   usage	   rather	   than	   any	   identity	   of	  meaning.	   Temporal	   and	   personal	   factors	   are	   also	  
significant.”).	  In	  particular,	  with	  regard	  to	  the	  scope	  of	  protection	  under	  10bis	  PC,	  see	  STEPHEN	  P.	  
LADAS,	   PATENTS,	   TRADEMARKS	   AND	  RELATED	   RIGHTS:	   NATIONAL	   AND	   INTERNATIONAL	   PROTECTION	   1685	  
(1975)	  (arguing	  that	  “more	  concrete	  and	  detailed	  stipulations	  concerning	  acts	  of	  unfair	  competi-­‐
tion	  [beyond	  explicitly	  stated	  in	  10bis	  PC	  would	  be]	  extremely	  difficult,	  if	  not	  impossible”);	  G.	  H.	  C.	  
BODENHAUSEN,	  GUIDE	  TO	  THE	  APPLICATION	  OF	  THE	  PARIS	  CONVENTION	  FOR	  THE	  PROTECTION	  OF	  INDUSTRIAL	  
PROPERTY	  AS	  REVISED	  AT	  STOCKHOLM	  IN	  1967,	  144	  (stating	  that	  “[t]he	  various	  countries	  of	  the	  [Paris]	  
Union	   have	   different	   concepts	   of	  what	   is	   to	   be	   understood	   by	   “unfair	   competition”	  and	   further	  
stating	   that	   “[i]n	   giving	   effective	   protection	   against	   unfair	   competition,	   each	   country	  may	   itself	  
determine	  which	  acts	  come	  under	  this	  category,	  provided	  however,	  that	  paragraphs	  (2)	  and	  (3)	  of	  
the	   Article	   under	   consideration	   are	   complied	   with”);	   Annette	   Kur,	  What	   to	   Protect,	   and	   How?:	  
Unfair	   Competition,	   Intellectual	   Property,	   or	   Protection	   Sui	   Generis,	  MAX	   PLANCK	   INST.	   FOR	   INTELL.	  
PROP.	  AND	  COMPETITION	  LAW,	  2–3,	  available	  at	  http://ssrn.com/abstract=2268585	  (concluding	  that	  
“the	  scope	  and	  practical	  impact	  of	  internationally	  mandatory	  protection	  outside	  the	  core	  area	  of	  
representations	  which	  mislead	  the	  public	  as	  to	  the	  properties	  and	  commercial	  origin	  of	  goods,	  or	  
which	  discredit	  competitors	  by	  false	  allegations,	  are	  likewise	  quite	  uncertain”	  and	  “unlike	  trade-­‐
marks,	  patents	  and	  industrial	  designs,	  the	  contours	  of	  what	  is	  meant	  by	  protection	  against	  unfair	  
competition	  have	  not	  become	  more	  visible	  in	  the	  TRIPS	  Agreement,	  which	  even	  does	  not	  refer	  to	  
that	  term	  anywhere	  in	  the	  text”).	  
	   37.	   	  Reichman,	  supra	  note	  20,7,,	   at	  19	   (concluding	   that	   “the	  collocation	  of	   clinical	   test	  data	  
within	  the	  provisions	  regulating	  unfair	  competition	  negated	  any	  inference	  that	  the	  TRIPS	  drafters	  
had	  imposed	  an	  exclusive	  intellectual	  property	  right	  on	  this	  subject	  matter	  .	  .	  .	  .”).	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data	  protection,	   they	  do	  not	   clarify	  how	   the	   “common	   intention”38	  on	  
the	  minimum	  standard	  of	  data	  protection	  was	  finally	  achieved.	  Rather	  
than	  providing	  a	  detailed	  chronicle	  of	  negotiations	  of	  39.3	  TRIPS,39	  this	  
section	  focuses	  on	  the	  conceptual	  aspects	  of	  draft	  proposals.	  
The	   negotiation	   records	   reveal	   striking	   differences	   in	   the	   posi-­‐
tions	  of	  the	  negotiating	  parties	  regarding	  the	  protection	  of	  undisclosed	  
information,	  in	  general,	  and	  of	  regulatory	  data,	  in	  particular.	  India,	  for	  
instance,	   argued	   that	   “trade	   secrets	   could	   not	   be	   considered	   form	   of	  
intellectual	   property	  .	  .	  .	  .	   [T]he	   fundamental	   basis	   of	   an	   intellectual	  
property	   right	   was	   the	   disclosure,	   publication	   and	   registration	   of	   the	  
subject	  matter	  of	  protection,	  whereas	  confidentiality	  and	  secrecy	  were	  
fundamental	   to	   trade	   secrets”.40	   In	   sharp	   contrast,	   the	   U.S.	   asserted	  
that	  the	  “issue	  underlying	  the	  protection	  of	  trade	  secrets	  was	  the	  same	  
as	  that	  underlying	  the	  protection	  of	  intellectual	  property	  rights	  gener-­‐
ally,	  namely	  that	  of	  not	  benefitting	  from	  the	  fruits	  and	  labours	  of	  others	  
improperly.	  .	  .	  .	  [I]n	  no	  event	  should	  the	  recipient	  of	  the	  information	  be	  
allowed	  to	  use	  such	   information	  to	  compete	  with	  the	  person	  who	  had	  
generated	   it.”41	   In	   line	   with	   this	   argument,	   Switzerland	   stated	   that	  
“[a]lthough	   proprietary	   information	   differed	   from	   other	   intellectual	  
property	   rights	   in	   terms	   of	   the	   disclosure	   requirements,	   it	   embodied	  
the	  central	  idea	  underlying	  IPR	  protection,	  namely	  that	  of	  the	  preserva-­‐
tion	   of	   the	   exclusive	   commercial	   use	   of	   information	   created	   by	   invest-­‐
ment	  of	  time,	  human	  and	  financial	  resources.”42	  Canada	  emphasized	  the	  
importance	  of	  protection	  of	  trade	  secrets	  for	  “providing	  a	  secure	  envi-­‐
ronment	  for	  the	  transfer	  of	  technology”	  but	  insisted	  that	  the	  protection	  
of	   trade	   secrets	   be	   confined	   to	   uses	   contrary	   to	   honest	   commercial	  
practices.43	  
	  
	   38.	   	  Appellate	   Body	   Report,	   European	   Communities–Customs	   Classification	   of	   Certain	   Com-­‐
puter	  Equipment,	  para.	  84,	  WT/DS62/AB/R,	  (adopted	  June	  22,),	  (“The	  purpose	  of	  treaty	  interpre-­‐
tation	   under	   Article	   31	   of	   the	   Vienna	   Convention	   is	   to	   ascertain	   the	   common	   intentions	   of	   the	  
parties.	  These	  common	  intentions	  cannot	  be	  ascertained	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  subjective	  and	  unilat-­‐
erally	  determined	  ‘expectations’	  of	  one	  of	  the	  parties	  to	  a	  treaty.”).	  
	   39.	   	  For	  detailed	  legislative	  background,	  see	  generally	  DANIEL	  GERVAIS,	  THE	  TRIPS	  AGREEMENT,	  
THE	  DRAFTING	  HISTORY	  AND	  ANALYSIS	  (2012);	  NUNO	  PIRES	  DE	  CARVALHO,	  THE	  TRIPS	  REGIME	  OF	  PATENTS	  
AND	  TEST	  DATA	  (2014).)	  (emphasis	  added).).	  
	   40.	   Negotiating	  Group	  on	  Trade-­‐Related	  Aspects	  of	  Intellectual	  Property	  Rights,	  Note	  by	  the	  
Secretariat:	  Meeting	  of	  Negotiating	  Group	  of	  July	  12–14,	  1989,	  para.	  90,	  MTN.GNG/NG11/14	  (Sept.	  
12,	  1989).)	  (emphasis	  added).).	  
	   41.	   	  Negotiating	  Group	  on	  Trade-­‐Related	  Aspects	  of	  Intellectual	  Property	  Rights,	  Note	  by	  the	  
Secretariat:	   Meeting	   of	   Negotiating	   Group	   of	   October	   30–November	   2,	   1989,	   para.	   61,	  
MTN.GNG/NG11/16	  (Dec.	  4,	  1989)	  (emphasis	  added).	  	  
	   42.	   	  Negotiating	  Group	  on	  Trade-­‐Related	  Aspects	  of	  Intellectual	  Property	  Rights,	  Note	  by	  the	  
Secretariat:	   Meeting	   of	   Negotiating	   Group	   of	   December	   11,	   12	   and	   14,	   1989,	   para.	   44,	  
MTN.GNG/NG11/17	  (Jan.	  23,	  1990)	  (emphasis	  added).	  	  
	   43.	   	  Standards	   for	   Trade-­‐Related	   Intellectual	   Property	   Rights,	   para.	   18(H),	  
MTN.GNG/NG11/W/47,	  (Oct.	  25,	  1989).)	  (emphases	  added.).).	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The	  negotiations	  of	  the	  would-­‐be	  39	  TRIPS	  took	  place	  mostly	  dur-­‐
ing	  the	  second	  stage	  of	  the	  Uruguay	  round	  in	  1990-­‐1991.	  Three	  drafts	  
represent	   the	   main	   stages	   of	   negotiations:	   the	   Chairman’s	   report	   of	  
July	   23,	   1990	   (providing	   “a	   compilation	   of	   the	   options	   for	   legal	   com-­‐
mitments	   as	   they	  have	  emerged	   from	  a	  process	  of	   informal	   consulta-­‐
tions	   [and]	  .	  .	  .	   intended	   as	   a	   basis	   for	   further	   negotiation”);44	   the	  
Brussels	  draft	  of	  December	  3,	  1990	  (“a	  first	  approximation	  to	  the	  Final	  
Act	  embodying	  the	  results	  of	  the	  Uruguay	  Round	  of	  Multilateral	  Trade	  
Negotiations”);45	   and	   the	   Dunkel	   draft	   of	   December	   20,	   1991	   (“of-­‐
fer[ing]	   a	   concrete	   and	   comprehensive	   representation	   of	   the	   final	  
global	   package	   of	   the	   results	   of	   the	   Uruguay	   Round”).46	   The	   Dunkel	  
draft	  was	  eventually	  adopted	  as	   the	   final	  version	  of	   the	  TRIPS	  Agree-­‐
ment	  on	  April	  15,	  1994.	  
The	  protection	  of	  regulatory	  data	  was	  initiated	  by	  the	  U.S.,	  which	  
included	  it	  within	  a	  set	  of	  provisions	  on	  trade	  secrets:	  
D.	  Trade	  secrets	  
6.	  Conditions	  on	  Government	  Use	  
Trade	   secrets	   submitted	   to	   governments	   shall	   not	   be	   disclosed	   or	  
used	   for	   the	   benefit	   of	   third	   parties	   except	   in	   compelling	   circum-­‐
stances	   involving	   major	   national	   emergencies	   posing	   an	   imminent	  
unreasonable	   risk	   to	   health	   or	   the	   environment,	   or	   to	   facilitate	   re-­‐
quired	  health	  and	  safety	  registrations.	  Government	  use	  or	  disclosure	  
on	  the	  basis	  of	  a	  national	  emergency	  may	  only	  be	  made	  where	  other	  
reasonable	  means	  are	  not	  available	  to	  satisfy	  the	  need	  for	  which	  the	  
government	   seeks	   to	   disclose	   or	   use	   the	   trade	   secret,	   and	   the	   gov-­‐
ernment	  may	   use	   it	   only	   for	   the	   duration	   of	   that	   emergency.	   Gov-­‐
ernment	   use	   or	   disclosure	   to	   facilitate	   required	   health	   and	   safety	  
registrations	  may	  only	  be	  made	  if	  the	  trade	  secret	  has	  not	  been	  sub-­‐
mitted	  within	  the	  previous	  ten	  years	  and	  full	  compensation	  is	  made	  
for	  the	  use	  or	  disclosure.	  In	  any	  case,	  a	  government	  shall	  not	  use	  or	  
disclose	  a	  trade	  secret	  to	  an	  extent	  greater	  than	  required	  to	  achieve	  
one	  of	  the	  above	  needs	  without	  providing	  the	  submitter	  with	  a	  rea-­‐
sonable	   opportunity	   to	   oppose	   the	   proposed	   use	   or	   disclosure,	   in-­‐
cluding	   the	   opportunity	   to	   secure	   judicial	   review,	   or	   without	  
	  
	   44.	   	  Negotiating	  Group	  on	  Trade-­‐Related	  Aspects	  of	   Intellectual	  Property	  Rights,	  Report	   by	  
Chairman:	  Status	  of	  Work	  in	  the	  Negotiating	  Group,	  MTN.GNG/NG11/W/76	  (Jul.	  23	  1990)	  [here-­‐
inafter	  Chairman’s	  Report].	  
	   45.	   	  Trade	   Negotiations	   Committee,	  Draft	   Final	   Act	   Embodying	   the	   Results	   of	   the	   Uruguay	  
Round	  of	  Multilateral	  Trade	  Negotiations,	  MTN.TNC/W/35/Rev.1	  (Dec.	  3,	  1990)	  [hereinafter	  The	  
Brussels	  draft].	  
	   46.	   	  Trade	   Negotiations	   Committee,	  Draft	   Final	   Act	   Embodying	   the	   Results	   of	   the	   Uruguay	  
Round	  of	  Multilateral	  Trade	  Negotiations,	  MTN.TNC/W/FA	  (Dec.	  20,	  1991)	  [hereinafter	  The	  Dun-­‐
kel	  draft].	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providing	  for	  the	  payment	  of	  full	  compensation	  as	  in	  the	  case	  of	  per-­‐
sonal	  property.47	  
A	  conceptually	  different	  proposal	  was	  later	  tabled	  by	  the	  EC:	  
G.	  Acts	  contrary	  to	  honest	  commercial	  practices	  including	  protection	  
of	  undisclosed	  information	  
Article	  28	  
In	  the	  course	  of	  ensuring	  effective	  protection	  against	  unfair	  competi-­‐
tion	  as	  provided	  for	  in	  Article	  10bis	  of	  the	  Paris	  Convention	  -­‐	  
[.	  .	  .]	  
(b)	   Contracting	   parties,	  when	   requiring	   the	   publication	   or	   submis-­‐
sion	  of	  test	  or	  other	  data,	  the	  origination	  of	  which	  involves	  a	  consid-­‐
erable	  effort,	  shall	  protect	  such	  efforts	  against	  unfair	  exploitation	  by	  
competitors.	   The	   protection	   shall	   last	   for	   a	   reasonable	   time	   com-­‐
mensurate	  with	  such	  efforts,	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  data	  required,	  the	  ex-­‐
penditure	  involved	  in	  their	  preparation	  and	  shall	  take	  account	  of	  the	  
availability	  of	  other	  forms	  of	  protection.48	  
The	  U.S.	   and	  EC	  approaches	  differed	   in	   several	  principal	  aspects.	  
Whereas	  the	  U.S.	  stipulated	  the	  protection	  of	  trade	  secrets	  as	  personal	  
property,	  the	  EC	  subjected	  the	  protection	  of	  undisclosed	  information49	  
to	  unfair	  competition.	  The	  U.S.	  focused	  on	  government	  use	  as	  a	  special	  
case	  within	  a	  comprehensive	  set	  of	  provisions	  on	  trade	  secrets,	  where-­‐
as	  the	  EC	  directed	  the	  protection	  against	  unfair	  exploitation	  by	  compet-­‐
itors.	   Whereas	   the	   U.S.	   stipulated	   the	   protection	   of	   data,	   the	   EC	  
required	  the	  protection	  of	  efforts	  involved	  in	  data	  generation.	  The	  U.S.	  
prescribed	  a	   specific	  mode	  of	  protection—a	   ten-­‐year	   term	  of	  non-­‐use	  
of	   test	   data	   for	   generic	   approval.50	   In	   contrast,	   the	   EC	   proposed	   the	  
principle	   of	  protection	  based	  on	   the	   idea	  of	  proportionality	   and	   case-­‐
by-­‐case	  appraisal—the	  “reasonable”	  measure	  of	  protection	  intended	  to	  
be	  correlated	  with	  the	  value	  of	  data,	  efforts	  and	  expenditures	  involved	  
in	  their	  generation,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  availability	  of	  other	  forms	  of	  protec-­‐
tion.	  
	  
	   47.	   Negotiating	  Group	  on	  Trade-­‐Related	  Aspects	  of	   Intellectual	  Property	  Rights,	  Suggestion	  
by	   the	   United	   States	   for	   Achieving	   the	   Negotiating	   Objective,	   §	   III(D)(6),	  
MTN.GNG/NG11/W/14/Rev.1	  (Oct.	  17,	  1988)	  (emphasis	  added).	  	  
	   48.	   Negotiating	   Group	   on	   Trade-­‐Related	   Aspects	   of	   Intellectual	   Property	   Rights,	   Draft	  
Agreement	  on	  Trade	  Related	  Aspects	  of	  Intellectual	  Property	  Rights,	  MTN.GNG/NG11/W/68	  (Mar.	  
29,	  1990).	  
	   49.	   	  The	   term	   “undisclosed	   information”	   was	   proposed	   by	   the	   EC	   as	   being	   “less	   likely	   to	  
generate	  confusion”	  than	  “proprietary	  information”	  earlier	  suggested	  by	  Switzerland.	  See	  Negoti-­‐
ating	  Group	  on	  Trade-­‐Related	  Aspects	  of	  Intellectual	  Property	  Rights,	  (see	  Meeting	  of	  Negotiating	  
Group	  of	  May	  14,	  1990,	  para.	  45,	  MTN.GNG/NG11/21,	  (Jun.	  22,	  1990).	  
	   50.	   	  Later	  on,	  the	  U.S.	  draft	  proposal	  was	  criticized	  for	  “tend[ing]	  to	  put	  too	  much	  emphasis	  
on	  the	  interests	  of	  owners	  over	  users	  of	  intellectual	  property	  rights,	  on	  the	  role	  of	  governments	  
over	   private	   parties	   in	   their	   enforcement,	   on	   detail	   over	   principles,	   and	   on	   effectiveness	   over	  
safeguards	  for	  legitimate	  traders.”	  Id.,	  para.	  13.	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The	  version	  in	  the	  Brussels	  draft	  was	  essentially	  based	  on	  the	  EU	  
proposal,	  but	  it	  also	  incorporated	  the	  non-­‐use	  rule	  of	  the	  U.S.	  submis-­‐
sion:	  
4A.	  PARTIES,	  when	  requiring,	  as	  a	   condition	  of	  approving	   the	  mar-­‐
keting	   of	   new	   pharmaceutical	   products	   or	   of	   a	   new	   agricultural	  
chemical	  product,	   the	  submission	  of	  undisclosed	   test	  or	  other	  data,	  
the	  origination	  of	  which	  involves	  a	  considerable	  effort,	  shall	  [protect	  
such	  data	  against	  unfair	  commercial	  use.	  Unless	  the	  person	  submit-­‐
ting	  the	  information	  agrees,	  the	  data	  may	  not	  be	  relied	  upon	  for	  the	  
approval	  of	  competing	  products	   for	  a	  reasonable	  time,	  generally	  no	  
less	   than	   five	  years,	   commensurate	  with	   the	  efforts	   involved	   in	   the	  
origination	  of	  the	  data,	  their	  nature,	  and	  the	  expenditure	  involved	  in	  
their	   preparation.	   In	   addition,	   PARTIES	   shall]	   protect	   such	   data	  
against	  disclosure,	  except	  where	  necessary	  to	  protect	  the	  public.]51	  
As	  evidenced,	   the	  entire	  section	  on	   the	  protection	  of	  undisclosed	  
information	  is	  still	  square-­‐bracketed	  remaining	  among	  the	  “major	  out-­‐
standing	  issues	  on	  points	  of	  substance”	  that	  required	  further	  negotia-­‐
tion.52	   Inside	   the	  brackets,	   two	  options	  can	  be	  distinguished:	   the	   first	  
contained	   a	   detailed	   explication	   of	   the	   non-­‐reliance	   rule,	   the	   second	  
contained	  a	  more	  generally	  phrased	  requirement	  to	  protect	  regulatory	  
data	  against	  disclosure	  with	  only	  one	  exception	  –	  “where	  necessary	  to	  
protect	  the	  public”.	  
The	  second	  condition	  for	  data	  disclosure	  “slipped	  into”	  the	  text	  at	  
the	  end	  of	  the	  very	  late	  stage	  of	  the	  negotiations.	  Although	  during	  the	  
meetings	  held	   in	  September	  1991	   “some	  discussion	  on	  Paragraph	  4A	  
[the	  would-­‐be	   TRIPS	   39.3]	   had	   taken	   place”53,	   as	   of	   November	   1991	  
“the	   outstanding	   issues	   [were]	   still	   essentially	   as	   contained	   in	   the	  
Chairman’s	  [draft/version]”.54	  The	  following	  representation	  shows	  the	  
	  
	   51.	   	  Brussels	  draft,	  supra	  note	  45,	  at	  215.	  
	   52.	   	  The	  Brussels	  draft,	  supra	  note	  45,	  at	  195.	  The	  main	  divide	  concerned	  the	  issue	  whether	  
trade	   secrets	   constitute	   intellectual	   property.	   See	   also	   Negotiating	   Group	   on	   Trade-­‐Related	   As-­‐
pects	  of	  Intellectual	  Property	  Rights,	  Note	  by	  the	  Secretariat:	  Meeting	  of	  Negotiating	  Group	  of	  Oct.	  
30-­‐Nov.	  214,	  1989,	  para.	  63,	  MTN.GNG/NG11/16,	  (Sept.	  12,	  1989)	  (reporting	  that	  “[s]ome	  delega-­‐
tions	  reiterated	  their	  view	  that	  trade	  secrets	  did	  not	  constitute	  a	  form	  of	  intellectual	  property	  and	  
therefore	  fell	  outside	  the	  scope	  of	  the	  work	  of	  the	  Group.	  Since	  there	  was	  no	  disclosure	  it	  could	  
not	  be	  regarded	  as	  a	  form	  of	  intellectual	  property	  and	  there	  would	  be	  no	  means	  of	  knowing	  what	  
any	   intellectual	   right	   actually	  protected.	   Some	  of	   these	  participants	   said	   that	   this	  did	  not	  mean	  
that	  they	  did	  not	  recognise	  the	  need	  for	  know-­‐how	  to	  be	  protected	  and	  also	  its	  importance	  for	  the	  
transfer	  of	  technology.	  However,	  such	  protection	  should	  be	  accorded	  under	  other	  civil	  and	  crimi-­‐
nal	  law,	  including	  contract	  law,	  not	  by	  IPR	  law.”);	  Negotiating	  Group	  on	  Trade-­‐Related	  Aspects	  of	  
Intellectual	  Property	  Rights,	  Note	  by	  the	  Secretariat:	  Meeting	  of	  Negotiating	  Group	  of	  May	  14–16,	  
1990,	  	  para.	  49,	  MTN.GNG/NGll/21,	  (Jun.	  22,	  1990)	  (citing	  participants	  who	  proposed	  that	  “trade	  
secrets	  protection	  should	  be	  left	  to	  national	  law.”).	  
	   53.	   ),	   Negotiating	  Group	   on	  Trade-­‐Related	  Aspects	   of	   Intellectual	   Property	  Rights,	  Note	   by	  
the	   Secretariat:),	   Meeting	   of	   Negotiating	   Group	   of	   September	   16	   and	   20,	   1991,	   para.	   10,	  
MTN.GNG/TRIPS/2,	  (Oct.	  7,	  1991).	  	  
	   54.	   	  Trade	  Negotiations	  Committee,	  Progress	  of	  Work	   in	  Negotiating	  Group:	  Stock-­‐Taking	  8,	  
MTN.TNC/W/89/Add.1	  (Nov.	  7,	  1991).	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rapid	  change	  that	  occurred	  within	  a	  few	  weeks	  and	  it	  was	  adopted	  as	  
the	  final	  version	  concluding	  the	  results	  of	  the	  negotiations.	  
4A	  3.	  PARTIES,	  when	  requiring,	  as	  a	  condition	  of	  approving	  the	  mar-­‐
keting	   of	   new	   pharmaceutical	   products	   or	   of	   a	   new	   agricultural	  
chemical	   product	  products	  which	  utilize	  new	   chemical	   entities,	   the	  
submission	   of	   undisclosed	   test	   or	   other	   data,	   the	   origination	   of	  
which	  involves	  a	  considerable	  effort,	  shall	  protect	  such	  data	  against	  
unfair	  commercial	  use.	  Unless	  the	  person	  submitting	  the	  information	  
agrees,	  the	  data	  may	  not	  be	  relied	  upon	  for	  the	  approval	  of	  compet-­‐
ing	  products	  for	  a	  reasonable	  time,	  generally	  no	  less	  than	  five	  years,	  
commensurate	  with	  the	  efforts	  involved	  in	  the	  origination	  of	  the	  da-­‐
ta,	  their	  nature,	  and	  the	  expenditure	  involved	  in	  their	  preparation.	  In	  
addition,	  PARTIES	  shall]	  protect	  such	  data	  against	  disclosure,	  except	  
where	  necessary	  to	  protect	  the	  public,],	  or	  unless	  steps	  are	  taken	  to	  
ensure	  that	  the	  data	  are	  protected	  against	  unfair	  commercial	  use.55	  
Thus,	  the	  detailed	  exposition	  of	  the	  non-­‐reliance	  rule	  was	  crossed	  
out,	   and	   the	   second	   factor	  of	  disclosure—”or	  unless	   steps.	  .	  .”—added	  
on	  the	  exception	  part.	  
There	  are	  several	  ways	   to	   interpret	   this	  change.	  One	  can	  assume	  
that	   the	   non-­‐use	   rule	   was	   a	   stand-­‐alone	   obligation	   and,	   once	   it	   was	  
gone	  from	  the	  final	  draft,	  there	  is	  no	  obligation	  to	  restrict	  the	  referen-­‐
tial	   use	   of	   data	   to	   facilitate	   generic	   approval.	   In	   favor	   of	   this	   version	  
speaks	   the	   fact	   that	   the	  notion	  of	   unfair	   commercial	   exploitation	   and	  
the	  non-­‐use	  rule	  originated	  from	  different	  draft	  proposals.	  
However,	  the	  way	  that	  the	  non-­‐reliance	  rule	  was	  later	  positioned	  
in	  the	  Brussels	  draft	  suggests	  that	  it	  was	  related	  to	  the	  notion	  of	  unfair	  
commercial	  use.	  The	  relationship	  between	  the	  two	  first	  two	  sentences	  
can	   be	   viewed	   as	   a	   general	   clause	   with	   explication—i.e.,	   the	   non-­‐
reliance	   rule	   was	   the	   only,	   exhaustive,	   content	   of	   unfair	   competition	  
use.	  In	  this	  case,	  the	  ellipsis	  of	  the	  explication	  from	  the	  final	  draft	  can	  
be	  interpreted	  that	  its	  meaning	  remained	  present	  in	  the	  obligation	  “in	  
spirit.”56	  This	  explanation,	  however,	  does	  not	   seem	   logical:	   if	   the	  par-­‐
ties	  reached	  the	  consent	  on	  the	  standard	  of	  protection,	  why	  would	  the	  
non-­‐reliance	  clause	  be	  crossed	  out?	  
Alternatively,	   the	   relationship	   between	   the	   first	   and	   the	   second	  
sentences	   can	   be	   seen	   as	   a	   general	   clause	   with	   illustration—i.e.,	   the	  
non-­‐reliance	  rule	  was	  meant	  to	  be	  one	  of	  the	  possible	  modes	  of	  protec-­‐
	  
	   55.	   	  The	  Dunkel	  draft,	  supra	  note	  46,	  at	  75.	  (emphasis	  added).	  
	   56.	   	  For	   instance,	   in	   the	  words	  of	   Jacques	  Gorlin,	   “United	  States	  negotiators	  agreed	  to	  drop	  
the	  non-­‐reliance	  language,	  because	  they	  viewed	  the	  phrase	  as	  no	  more	  than	   ‘belts	  and	  suspend-­‐
ers’,	   that	   is,	   the	   accepted	   definition	   at	   the	   time	   of	   ‘protection	   against	   unfair	   commercial	   use’	  
included	  non-­‐reliance	  for	  a	  fixed	  period	  of	  time	  for	  new	  chemical	  entities	  and	  the	  second	  phrase	  
was,	   therefore,	   not	   needed.”	   JACQUES	   J.	   GORLIN,	   AN	   ANALYSIS	   OF	   THE	   PHARMACEUTICAL-­‐RELATED	  
PROVISIONS	  OF	  THE	  TRIPS	  (INTELLECTUAL	  PROPERTY)	  AGREEMENT	  48	  (1999).	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tion.	  In	  this	  case,	  the	  deletion	  of	  the	  second	  sentence	  can	  be	  interpret-­‐
ed	  to	  mean	  that	  the	  countries	  agreed	  not	  to	  impose	  data	  exclusivity	  as	  
the	   only	   possible	   form	  of	   protection,	   strictly	   conditioned	   on	   the	   con-­‐
sent,	   compensation	   and	   specific	   time	   period.57	   Such	   a	   compromised	  
interpretation	  can	   justify	  policies	  based	  on	  the	  compensatory	   liability	  
approach.58	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  the	  question	  of	  the	  minimum	  standard	  of	  
protection	  as	  mandated	  under	  39.3	  TRIPS	  remains	  unsettled.	  59	  
	  
	   57.	   	  Such	   intermediary	   position	   seems	   to	   prevail	   among	   scholars.	   See,	   e.g.,	   Aaron	   Xavier	  
Fellmeth,	  Secrecy,	  Monopoly	  and	  Access	  to	  Pharmaceuticals	  in	  International	  Trade	  Law:	  Protection	  
of	  Marketing	  Approval	  Data	  under	  the	  TRIPs	  Agreement,	  45	  Harv.	  Int’l	  L.J.	  443,	  453	  (2004)	  (argu-­‐
ing	  that	  “rel[anceianceance]	  on	  this	  [marketing	  approval]	  data	  to	  obtain	  marketing	  approval	  for	  
similar	  or	   identical	  drugs,	   [	  does	  not]	  violate	  standards	  of	  honesty	  or	  mislead	  anyone.”);	  CARLOS	  
MARIA	   CORREA,	   PROTECTION	   OF	   DATA	   SUBMITTED	   FOR	   THE	   REGISTRATION	   OF	   PHARMACEUTICALS:	  
IMPLEMENTING	  THE	  STANDARDS	  OF	  THE	  TRIPS	  AGREEMENT	  51	  (2002)	  (stating	  that	  the	  “wording,	  con-­‐
text	  and	  purpose	  of	  the	  article	  does	  not	  support	  an	  interpretation	  that	  the	  required	  protection	  can	  
be	  implemented	  only	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  an	  exclusivity	  protection.”);	  Jerome	  H.	  Reichman,	  Rethinking	  
the	   Role	   of	   Clinical	   Trial	   Data,	   in	   International	   Intellectual	   Property	   Law:	   The	   Case	   for	   a	   Public	  
Goods	  Approach,	   13	  MARQ	   INTELL.	  PROP.	  L.	  REV.REVIEW	  1,	  65–66	   (2009)	   (arguing	   that	  39.3	  TRIPS	  
“does	  not	  prevent	  governments	  from	  authorizing	  the	  generic	  manufacture	  of	  bioequivalent	  prod-­‐
ucts	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  foreign	  regulatory	  approvals	  and	  the	  relevant	  scientific	  literature.	  .	  .	  .	  If	  some	  
form	  of	  compromise	  on	   the	   issue	  of	   clinical	   test	  data	  becomes	  unavoidable,	  developing	  country	  
negotiators	  should	  stand	  firm	  on	  cost-­‐sharing	  counter-­‐proposals	  that	  would	  at	  least	  avoid	  barri-­‐
ers	  to	  entry	  for	  generic	  producers.”);	  Carvalho,	  supra	  note	  39,	  para.	  39.137	  (stating	  that	  “although	  
draft	   language	  that	  would	  clarify	  the	  meaning	  of	  the	  term	  “unfair	  commercial	  use”	  has	  not	  been	  
retained,	  the	  text	  of	  Article	  39.3	  contains	  elements	  that	  lead	  to	  the	  inevitable	  conclusion	  that	  the	  
primary	  purpose	  of	  that	  provision	  is	  .	  .	  .	  to	  protect	  test	  data	  .	  .	  .	  from	  preventing	  governments	  from	  
relying	  directly	  or	  indirectly	  on	  data	  provided	  by	  the	  first	  registrant	  and	  thus	  saving	  its	  competi-­‐
tors	  the	  efforts	  of	  developing	  and	  submitting	  their	  own	  test	  data	  -­‐	  unless	  those	  competitors	  obtain	  
authorization	  from	  the	  first	  registrant	  or	  if	  the	  law	  so	  permits,	  pay	  him	  compensation.”).	  
	   58.	   	  On	   the	   cost-­‐sharing	   approach	   to	   test	  data	  protection,	   see	  generally	   Judit	  Rius	   Sanjuan,	  
James	  Love,	  Robert	  Weissman,	  A	  Cost	  Sharing	  Model	  to	  Protect	  Investments	  in	  Pharmaceutical	  Test	  
Data,	  CPTech	  Policy	  Brief	  No.	  1	  (2006)	  available	  at	  http://www.cptech.org/publications/recent-­‐
publications.html,1	  (2006);	  Fellmeth,	  supra	  note	  57	  (proposing	  a	   “readjustable	  royalties	  model”	  
based	  on	   the	   cost-­‐sharing	  approach	   for	   regulating	   the	  use	  of	   test	  data	  as	  a	  possible	   solution	   to	  
reconcile	  imperatives	  of	  public	  health	  and	  innovation);	  Shamnad	  Basheer,	  Protection	  of	  Regulato-­‐
ry	  Data	  Under	  Article	  39.3	  of	  TRIPS:	  The	  Indian	  Context,	  23–29	  (2006)	  (discussing	  compensatory	  
liability	  model	  as	  an	  alternative	  approach	  to	  data	  protection	  and	  an	  intermediate	  standard	  under	  
39.3	  TRIPS.).	  
	   59.	   	  See	   U.S.	   Gov’t	   Accountability	   Office,	   GAO-­‐08-­‐751,	   U.S.	   TRADE	   POLICY	   GUIDANCE	   ON	  WTO	  
DECLARATION	  ON	  ACCESS	  TO	  MEDICINES	  MAY	  NEED	  CLARIFICATION,	  30–31	  (2007)	  (addressing	  the	  issue	  
whether	   the	   requirements	   imposed	   in	   Free	   Trade	   Agreements	   (FTAs)	  went	   beyond	   the	   TRIPS	  
Agreement,	   admitted	   that	   the	   provision	   was	   not	   amenable	   to	   such	   a	   clear	   interpretation:	  
“[W]hether	  FTA	  provisions	  on	  data	  exclusivity	  go	  beyond	  TRIPS	  is	  less	  clear[.	  .	  .].	  .	  .	  .[.	  .	  .]	  There	  are	  
different	  interpretations	  of	  the	  obligations	  under	  TRIPS	  39(3),	  and	  exactly	  what	  practices	  can	  be	  
considered	  a	  fulfilment	  of	  this	  obligation.	  One	  interpretation	  of	  TRIPS	  39(3)	  requires	  members	  to	  
grant	  the	  originator	  of	  the	  data	  a	  period	  of	  exclusive	  use	  similar	  to	  that	  provided	  by	  data	  exclusiv-­‐
ity	  laws	  in	  the	  United	  States.	  Under	  this	  interpretation,	  FTA	  provisions	  do	  not	  go	  beyond	  TRIPS.	  
Others	   do	   not	   believe	   that	   Article	   39(3)	   of	   TRIPS	   confers	   exclusive	   rights,	   but	   instead	   simply	  
requires	  countries	  to	  prevent	  third	  parties	  from	  using	  the	  originators’	  data	  for	  unfair	  commercial	  
purposes.	   This	   interpretation	   suggests	   that	   the	   FTA	   provision	   goes	   beyond	   the	   TRIPS	   require-­‐
ment.”).	  CfCompareCf	  the	  official	  position	  of	  the	  EC	  in	  this	  regard	  is	  that	  “the	  [TRIPS]	  Agreement	  
does	  contain	  an	  obligation	  to	  protect	  test	  data	  against	  ‘unfair	  commercial	  use’,	  and	  that	  the	  most	  
effective	  method	  of	  doing	  so	  is	  to	  deny	  the	  regulatory	  authorities	  the	  possibility	  of	  relying	  on	  such	  
data	   for	   a	   reasonable	   period	   of	   time.”	   Council	   Discussion	   on	   Access	   to	   Medicine,paper,	   Paper	  
Submitted	  by	  the	  EU	  to	  the	  TRIPS	  Council,	  for	  the	  Special	  Discussion	  on	  Intellectual	  Propertyspecial	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A.	  The	  WTO	  jurisprudence	  
Hitherto,	  39.3	  TRIPS	  has	  not	  been	  given	  interpretation	  in	  the	  WTO	  
jurisprudence.60	  At	  one	  point,	  the	  U.S.	  Government	  requested	  consulta-­‐
tions	   with	   the	   Government	   of	   the	   Republic	   of	   Argentina	   raising	   the	  
issue	   of	   compliance	   of	   national	   law	   of	   Argentina	   with	   the	   TRIPS	  
Agreement	  concerning,	  among	  others,	  test	  data	  protection.61	  Later	  on,	  
the	  parties	  notified	   the	  Dispute	   Settlement	  Body	   that,	   upon	   consulta-­‐
tions,	   they	   had	   “reached	   an	   agreement	   on	   all	   of	   the	  matters”.62	  With	  
regard	  to	  test	  data	  protection,	  the	  settlement	  agreement	  states:	  
In	   addition,	   the	   Parties	   agree	   that	   should	   the	   Dispute	   Settlement	  
Body	   adopt	   recommendations	   and	   rulings	   clarifying	   the	   content	   of	  
the	   rights	   related	   to	   undisclosed	   test	   data	   submitted	   for	   marketing	  
approval	   according	   to	   Article	   39.3	   of	   the	   TRIPS	   Agreement,	   and	  
should	  Argentinean	  law	  be	  inconsistent	  with	  Article	  39.3	  as	  clarified	  
by	   the	   above-­‐mentioned	   recommendations	   and	   rulings,	   Argentina	  
agrees	   to	   submit	   to	   the	   National	   Congress	   within	   one	   year	   an	  
amendment	  to	  Argentinean	  law,	  as	  necessary,	  to	  put	  its	  legislation	  in	  
conformity	  with	  its	  obligations	  under	  Article	  39.3	  as	  clarified	  in	  such	  
recommendations	  and	  rulings.63	  
As	  of	  today,	  the	  disputed	  provision	  under	  Argentinian	  law	  remains	  
intact.64	  
In	  some	  cases,	  the	  implementation	  of	  data	  protection	  in	  the	  form	  
of	   non-­‐reliance	  was	   required	   in	   the	   course	   of	   the	  WTO	  accession,	   as,	  
	  
discussion	   on	   intellectual	   property	   and	   access	   to	   medicinesAccessaccess	   to	   Medicines,	   para.	  
15medicines,	   IP/C/W/280	   (2001));)	   available	   at	  
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/paper_eu_w280_e.htm;));	   see	   also	   the	   EU	   Com-­‐
mission,	   Compulsory	   Licensing	   and	   Data	   Protection	   21	   (2001)	   available	   at	  
trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/html/122031.htm	   (stating	   that	   “[o]n	   its	   face,	   Article	   39.3	   of	   TRIPs	  
contains	  an	  obligation	  to	  protect	  test	  data	  against	  “‘“unfair	  commercial	  useuse’use,	  and	  it	  seems	  
that	   the	  most	   effective	  way	   to	   fulfil	   that	   objective,	   as	   envisaged	  by	   the	  TRIPs	   negotiators,	   is	   to	  
provide	  for	  data	  exclusivity	  over	  a	  reasonable	  period	  of	  time.	  Whether	  any	  system	  other	  than	  data	  
exclusivity	  over	  a	  reasonable	  period	  of	  time	  would	  meet	  the	  requirements	  of	  Article	  39.3	  of	  the	  
TRIPs	  Agreement	  is	  to	  be	  assessed	  on	  a	  case-­‐by-­‐case	  basis,	  but	  examples	  of	  actual	  application	  by	  
WTO	  Members	  of	  alternative	  -­‐	  and	  TRIPs	  compliant	  -­‐	  systems	  to	  non-­‐reliance	  over	  a	  reasonable	  
period	  do	  not	  appear	  to	  exist.”).	  
	   60.	   	  See	  World	  Trade	  Organization,	  WTO	  Analytical	  Index:	  TRIPS.	  Agreement	  on	  Trade-­‐Related	  
Aspects	   of	   Intellectual	   Property	   Rights,	   available	   at	  
http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/analytic_index_e/trips_e.htm	   (last	   accessed	   Feb.	  
11,	  2015).	  	  
	   61.	   	  World	   Trade	   Organization,	   Notification	   of	   Mutually	   Agreed	   Solution	   According	   to	   the	  
Conditions	   Set	   Forth	   in	   the	   Agreement,	   WT/DS171/3,	   WT/DS196/4,	   IP/D/18/Add.1,	  
IP/D/22/Add.1	  (Jun.	  20,	  2002).	  	  
	   62.	   Id.	  
	   63.	   	  Id.	  at	  para.	  9.	  (emphasis	  added).	  
	   64.	   	  Ley	  N°	  24.766	  de	  Confidencialidad	  sobre	  Informacion	  art.	  4	  (Sancionada:	  Diciembre	  18	  
de	  1996).	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for	  instance,	  in	  case	  of	  China.65	  One	  would	  assume	  that	  stipulating	  such	  
accession	  obligation	  is	  a	  prima	  facie	  proof	  in	  favor	  of	  data	  exclusivity	  as	  
the	   standard	   of	   protection	   under	   the	   TRIPS	   Agreement.	   However,	  
while	  the	  Report	  of	  the	  Working	  Party	  stipulates	  data	  protection	  under	  
exclusivity,	   it	  avoids	  direct	   reference	   to	  39.3	  TRIPS	  as	   the	  mandatory	  
standard	  protection.66	  
Thus,	   the	   issue	   remains	   open	   for	   speculation.	   Meanwhile,	   coun-­‐
tries	  that,	  during	  the	  TRIPS	  negotiations,	  advocated	  for	  the	  protection	  
of	   test	   data	   under	   exclusivity	   regime	   pursued	   a	   different	   strategy	   to	  
promoting	  data	   exclusivity	  under	  bilateral	   and	   regional	   trade	   and	   in-­‐
vestment	  agreements.67	  
IV.	  THE	  TELEOLOGICAL	  INTERPRETATION	  OF	  39.3	  TRIPS	  
This	  section	  seeks	  to	  identify	  the	  principle	  by	  which	  the	  legitimacy	  
of	  data	  use	  under	  39.3	  TRIPS	  can	  be	  evaluated.	   It	  starts	  with	  defining	  
the	  purpose	  and	  meaning	  of	  protection	  under	  39.3	  TRIPS	   (A)	   in	   con-­‐
junction	   with	   the	   referenced	   10bis	   PC	   and	   (B)	   as	   distinct	   from	   39.2	  
TRIPS.	  Furthermore,	  the	  principle	  is	  formulated	  (C)	  with	  regard	  to	  the	  
	  
	   65.	   	  See	  World	   Trade	  Organization,	  Report	   of	   the	  Working	   Party	   on	   the	   Accession	   of	   China,	  
paras	  282,	  284,	  WT/ACC/CHN/49,	  (Oct.	  1,	  2001).	  )During	  the	  accession	  negotiations,	  some	  Mem-­‐
bers	  of	  the	  Accession	  Working	  Party	  “expressed	  concerns”that	  China	  did	  not	  expressly	  provide	  in	  
its	  laws	  and	  regulations	  for	  protection	  “against	  unfair	  commercial	  use	  of	  undisclosed	  test	  or	  other	  
data	   submitted	  .	  .	  .	   in	   support	   of	   applications	   for	   marketing	   approval	   of	   pharmaceutical	   or	   of	  
agricultural	  chemical	  products	  which	  utilize	  new	  chemical	  entities”	  by	  providing	   that	  no	  person	  
other	  than	  the	  person	  that	  submitted	  such	  data	  may,	  without	  the	  permission	  of	  the	  person	  initial-­‐
ly	  submitting	  the	  data,	  rely	  on	   such	  data	   in	  support	  of	  an	  application	  for	  product	  approval	   for	  a	  
period	  of	  at	  least	  six	  years	  from	  the	  date	  on	  which	  marketing	  approval	  to	  the	  person	  that	  submit-­‐
ted	  the	  data	  had	  been	  granted.”	  Id.	  at	  para.	  282”	  (emphasis	  added).	  
	   66.	   	  Id.,	  Annex	  1A,	  §	  VI	  (a)	  (requiring	  as	  a	  part	  of	  “[i]nformation	  to	  be	  provided	  by	  China	  in	  
the	  context	  of	  the	  transitional	  review	  mechanism”,	  the	  submission	  of	  “amendments	  to	  Copyright,	  
Trademark	  and	  Patent	  Law,	  as	  well	  as	  relevant	  implementing	  rules	  covering	  different	  areas	  of	  the	  
TRIPS	  Agreement	  bringing	  all	  such	  measures	  into	  full	  compliance	  with	  and	  full	  application	  of	  the	  
TRIPS	  Agreement	  and	  the	  protection	  of	  undisclosed	  information”	  (emphasis	  added).).	  	  
	   67.	   	  For	   the	   recent	   statistics	   on	   special	   pharmaceutical	   provisions	   in	   regional	   trade	   agree-­‐
ments,	  see,	  e.g.,	  Raymundo	  Valdés	  and	  Maegan	  McCann,	  Intellectual	  Property	  Provisions	  in	  Region-­‐
al	  Trade	  Agreements:	  Revision	  and	  Update,	  World	  Trade	  Organization,,,	  8	   (2014)	  (examining	   the	  
sample	  of	  245	   regional	   trade	  agreements	   [RTAs]	  notified	   to	   the	  WTO	  and	   in	   force	  by	  February	  
2014.	  The	  statistical	  analysis	  accounts	  for	  the	   increase	  in	  RTAs	  with	  provisions	  related	  to	  phar-­‐
maceuticals	   including	   patent	   linkage	   and	   clinical	   data	   protection	   which	   “would	   be	   even	   more	  
apparent	  if	  the	  agreements	  establishing	  the	  EEC,	  EFTA	  and	  the	  Andean	  Community	  were	  excluded	  
from	  the	  count	  as	  initially	  they	  did	  not	  contain	  significant	  pharma-­‐related	  provisions	  as	  such	  but	  
rather	  established	  the	   legal	   frameworks	  within	  which	  such	  provisions	  were	  subsequently	   intro-­‐
duced”).	  See	  also	  the	  Bipartisan	  Trade	  Promotion	  Authority	  Act	  of	  2002,	  19	  U.S.C.A.	  §3802	  (2004)	  
(mandating	  that	  “the	  provisions	  of	  any	  multilateral	  or	  bilateral	  trade	  agreement	  governing	  intel-­‐
lectual	  property	  rights	   that	   is	  entered	   into	  by	   the	  United	  States	  reflect	  a	  standard	  of	  protection	  
similar	  to	  that	  found	  in	  United	  States	  law”);	  Ingo	  Meitinger,	  Implementation	  of	  Test	  Data	  Protec-­‐
tion	  According	  to	  Article	  39.3	  TRIPS:	  The	  Search	  for	  a	  Fair	  Interpretation	  of	  the	  Term	  ‘Unfair	  Com-­‐
mercial	   Use’,	   8	   J.	   WORLD	   INTELL.	   PROP.	   123,	   133–134	   (2005),	   at	   131	   (noting	   that	   some	   Eastern	  
European	  countries	  implemented	  data	  exclusivity	  in	  the	  course	  of	  the	  EU	  accession).	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objectives	   of	   the	   TRIPS	   Agreement,	   in	   particular,	   protecting	   against	  
trade	   distortions,	   and	   (D)	   in	   view	   of	   a	   peculiar	   intersection	   between	  
three	   regimes	   –	  unfair	   competition,	   trade	   secret,	   and	   sui	   generis	   data	  
protection.	  
A.	  The	  composite	  view	  of	  39.3	  TRIPS	  and	  10bis	  PC	  
What	   was	   the	   purpose	   of	   collocating	   regulatory	   data	   protection	  
with	  the	  repression	  of	  unfair	  competition?	  What	  does	  the	  clause	  “In	  the	  
course	   of	   ensuring	   effective	   protection	   against	   unfair	   competition”	  
suggest	   about	   the	   functional	   relation	   between	   the	   two	   provisions?	  
There	  is	  some	  unease	  in	  picturing	  such	  a	  “course”	  of	  events:	  normally,	  
a	  drug	  authority	  would	  not	  be	  expected	  to	  enforce	  unfair	  competition	  
law.	  Data	  submitted	  to	  for	  regulatory	  review	  would	  be	  subject	  to	  regu-­‐
lation	  under	  administrative	  law,	  whereas	  “unfair	  competition	  is	  gener-­‐
ally	   an	   issue	   between	   the	   competitors”68	   its	   “reference	   points”	   are	  
“actual	   commercial	   practices”,69	   and	   its	   enforcement	   is	   primarily	   car-­‐
ried	  out	  by	  the	  means	  and	  mechanisms	  of	  private	  law.70	  
Yet,	  the	  reference	  to	  10bis	  PC	  cannot	  be	  seen	  meaningless	  for	  the	  
interpretation	   of	   the	   obligation.71	  Neither	   should	   it	   be	   seen	   only	   as	   a	  
matter	   of	   formality—i.e.,	   serving	   the	   purpose	   of	   bringing	   into	   the	  
TRIPS	   Agreement	   the	   new	   subject	   matter	   of	   protection	   without	   ex-­‐
ceeding	   the	   negotiations	   mandate.72	   While,	   as	   a	   matter	   of	   historical	  
fact,	   concerns	   over	   exceeding	   the	   negotiation	  mandate	   cannot	   be	   de-­‐
nied,73	   as	  a	  matter	  of	  positive	   law,	  10bis	   PC	   should	  be	  given	  effective	  
	  
	   68.	   	  Rudolf	   Callmann,	  He	  Who	  Reaps	  Where	  He	  Has	  Not	   Sown:	  Unjust	   Enrichment	   in	  Unfair	  
Competition,	  55	  HARV.	  L.	  REV.	  595,	  608	  (1941).	  
	   69.	   	  FRAUKE	  HENNING-­‐BODEWIG,	  UNFAIR	  COMPETITION	  LAW.	  EUROPEAN	  UNION	  AND	  MEMBER	  STATES	  
10	  (2006).	  
	   70.	   	  Thomas	  M.	  J.	  Möllers	  &	  Andreas	  Heinemann,	  Outlook:	  The	  Link	  Between	  Unfair	  Competi-­‐
tion	  Law	  and	  Antitrust	  Law,	  in	  THE	  ENFORCEMENT	  OF	  COMPETITION	  LAW	  IN	  EUROPE	  659,	  663	  (Moellers	  
&	  Heinemann,	  eds,	  2008).	  
	   71.	   	  Meitinger,	  supra	  note	  67,	  at	  127	  (stating	  “the	  reference	  of	  Article	  39.1	  TRIPS	  to	  Article	  
10bis	  of	  the	  Paris	  Convention	  does	  not	  seem	  to	  provide	  for	  any	  guidance	  regarding	  the	  interpreta-­‐
tion	  of	  Article	  39.3	  TRIPS”.).	  
	   72.	   	  See	   Wadlow,	   supra	   note	   18,	   at	   30	   (stating	   that	   “the	   dependency	   of	   Article	   39(3)	   on	  
Articles	  39(1)	  and	  10bis	  [.	  .	  .].	  .	  .	  .[.	  .	  .]	  deliberate,	  it	  was	  presumably	  intended	  to	  meet	  the	  objection	  
that	  the	  negotiating	  mandate	  was	  at	  risk	  of	  being	  exceeded.”).	  
	   73.	   	  See	   GATT	   Secretariat,	   Meeting	   of	   Negotiating	   Group	   of	   10-­‐21	   September	   1990,	  
MTN.GNG/NG11/25	   (Oct.	   8,	   1990)	   (citing	   a	   participant,	   who	   “on	   behalf	   of	   several	   developing	  
countries	  .	  .	  .	  expressed	  serious	  reservations	  about	  what	  he	  considered	  to	  be	  an	  expansion	  of	  the	  
mandate	   to	   include	  trade	  secrets”.);	  GATT	  Secretariat,	  Meeting	  of	  Negotiating	  Group	  of	  8	  and	  18	  
October	   1990,	  MTN.GNG/NG11/26,	   para.	   7	   (Oct.	   31,	   1990)	   (citing	   a	   participant	   stating	   that	   the	  
fourteen	   countries	   that	   had	   sponsored	   document	   NG11/W/71	   “were	   ready	   to	   negotiate	   on	   all	  
aspects,	  except	  trade	  secrets	  which	  they	  continued	  to	  have	  difficulty	  with	  treating	  is	  as	  an	  intel-­‐
lectual	  property	  right”.	  Those	  fourteen	  countries	  included	  Argentina,	  Brazil,	  Chile,	  China,	  Colom-­‐
bia,	  Cuba,	  Egypt,	  India,	  Nigeria,	  Peru,	  Tanzania	  and	  Uruguay.).	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interpretation74	   in	   terms	   of	   adding	   substantive	   meaning	   to	   the	   data	  
protection	  obligations.	  Thus,	  legal	  protection	  under	  39.3	  TRIPS	  should	  
be	  applied	  in	  the	  context	  of	  competition;	  however,	   it	  should	  be	  differ-­‐
entiated	  from	  the	  protection	  provided	  under	  39.2	  TRIPS.	  
B.	  Protection	  under	  39.3	  vs.	  39.2	  TRIPS	  
Is	   39.2	   TRIPS	   applicable	   to	   regulatory	   data,	   and,	   if	   so,	   how	  does	  
the	  protection	  differ?	  As	  long	  as	  clinical	  data	  meet	  the	  criteria	  of	  secre-­‐
cy,	  commercial	  value	  and	  efforts	  to	  keep	  such	  data	  confidential,	  protec-­‐
tion	   shall	   be	   accorded.	   One	   could	   argue	   that,	   if	   a	   drug	   authority	   is	  
referred	  by	  “persons	  within	  the	  circles	  that	  normally	  deal	  with	  the	  kind	  
of	  information	  in	  question”,	  then	  the	  submission	  of	  clinical	  data	  in	  sup-­‐
port	   of	   drug	   marketing	   approval	   would	   be	   “secrecy	   destroying”	   and	  
such	   data	   can	   no	   longer	   satisfy	   the	   condition	   under	   39.2(a)	   TRIPS.	  
However,	  the	  clinical	  trial	  data	  become	  known	  to	  a	  drug	  authority	  only	  
because	   of	   their	   disclosure	   by	   a	   drug	   applicant	   in	   the	   course	   of	   drug	  
registration.	  Such	  disclosure	  does	  not	  change	  the	  status	  of	  the	  data	  of	  
not	  being	  “generally	  known”	  either	  to	  a	  drug	  authority	  before	  applica-­‐
tion	   or	   to	   the	   public	   in	   general.	   As	   for	   the	   conditions	   of	   commercial	  
value	  and	  efforts	  to	  keep	  data	  confidential	  under	  39.2	  (b)	  and	  (c),	  clini-­‐
cal	   data	   should	   normally	   satisfy	   them	   due	   to	   the	   substantial	   invest-­‐
ment	  incurred	  in	  the	  data	  generation.	  
In	  terms	  of	  the	  type	  of	  protection,	  under	  39.2	  TRIPS	  the	  regulatory	  
data	  shall	  be	  protected	  against	  unauthorized	  use,	  acquisition	  and	  dis-­‐
closure	  associated	  with	  dishonest	  commercial	  practices.	  Consequently,	  
the	  meaning	   of	   protection	   against	   unfair	   commercial	   use	   under	   39.3	  
TRIPS	  should	  be	  sought	  beyond	  the	  competitors’	  practices	  that	  consti-­‐
tute	  the	  core	  area	  of	  unfair	  competition.	  
C.	  The	  purpose	  of	  protection	  under	  39.3	  TRIPS	  in	  view	  of	  the	  objec-­‐
tives	  of	  the	  TRIPS	  Agreement	  
In	  practical	   terms,	   the	  TRIPS	  Agreement	  aims	   to	  protect	   interna-­‐
tional	  trade	  against	  the	  distortions	  that	  can	  arise	  from,	  among	  others,	  
the	   lack	   of	   effective	   and	   adequate	   protection	   of	   intellectual	   property	  
rights	  and	  impede	  the	  commercial	  interests	  of	  rights	  holders	  in	  foreign	  
	  
	   74.	   	  See	  Appellate	  Body	  Report,	  United	  States–Standards	   for	  Reformulated	  and	  Conventional	  
Gasoline,	  WT/DS2/AB/R,	  p.	  23,	  DSR	  1996:I,	  3,	  at	  23	  (stating	  that	  “[o]ne	  of	   the	  corollaries	  of	   the	  
‘“general	  rule	  of	  interpretation	  in	  the	  Vienna	  Convention	  is	  that	  interpretation	  must	  give	  meaning	  
and	   effect	   to	   all	   the	   terms	  of	   a	   treaty.	  An	   interpreter	   is	   not	   free	   to	   adopt	   a	   reading	   that	  would	  
result	  in	  reducing	  whole	  clauses	  or	  paragraphs	  of	  a	  treaty	  to	  redundancy	  or	  inutility.”).	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markets.75	   In	   the	   pharmaceutical	   sector,	   a	   particular	   type	   of	   market	  
distortion	  can	  be	  caused	  by	  drug	  regulations	  that	  can	  impact	  competi-­‐
tion	  between	  the	  originator	  and	  the	  generic	  companies.	  
As	  a	  sector-­‐specific	  provision,	  39.3	  TRIPS	  targets	  a	  particular	  situ-­‐
ation	  when	  clinical	  trial	  data	  are	  submitted	  for	  a	  regulatory	  review	  and	  
held	  by	  a	  government	  authority.76	  As	  evidenced	  from	  the	  negotiations	  
history,	  the	  inclusion	  of	  protection	  of	  regulatory	  data	  was	  initiated	  and	  
most	   actively	   negotiated	   by	   countries	   with	   strong	   research-­‐based	  
pharmaceutical	  industries77	  and	  opposed	  by	  those	  with	  robust	  generic	  
sectors.78	  The	  pertinent	  concern	  addressed	  during	  negotiations	  related	  
to	  the	  protection	  of	  trade	  and	  commercial	  interests	  of	  innovator	  com-­‐
panies	   against	   generic	   competition,	   especially,	   in	   the	  markets,	  where	  
patent	  protection	  for	  drugs	  was	  not	  available	  (and	  would	  not	  be	  avail-­‐
able	  for	  some	  time	  due	  to	  the	  transitional	  arrangements).	  In	  such	  mar-­‐
kets,	   innovator	  companies	  can	  rely	  on	   the	  regulatory	  barrier	   that	  can	  
eliminate	  the	  competition	  which	  can	  be	  significantly	  high	  due	  the	  sub-­‐
stantial	  burden	  of	  compliance	  that	  requires	  the	  conduct	  of	  highly	  risky,	  
investment-­‐intensive	  and	  time-­‐consuming	  clinical	  trials.79	  
	  
	   75.	   	  TRIPS	   Agreement:	   Preamble,	   WTO.ORG,	  
https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/27-­‐trips_02_e.htm	  (last	  visited	  April	  28,	  2015)..	  See	  
also	   GATT	   Secretariat,	  Meeting	   of	   25	   March	   1987,	   MTN.GNG/NG11/1,	   para.	   4	   (10	   April	   1987)	  
(citing	  participants	  who	  “spoke	  of	  the	  trade	  problems	  they	  saw	  as	  arising	  from	  the	  inadequate	  or	  
ineffective	  protection	  of	  intellectual	  property.”	  [.	  .	  .]	  	  It	  was	  said	  that	  trade	  distortions	  and	  impedi-­‐
ments	  were	  resulting	  from,	  among	  other	  things:	  the	  displacement	  of	  exports	  of	   legitimate	  goods	  
by	  unauthorized	  copies,	  or	  of	  domestic	  sales	  by	  imports	  of	  unauthorized	  copies;	  the	  disincentive	  
effect	  that	  inadequate	  protection	  of	  intellectual	  property	  rights	  had	  on	  inventors	  and	  creators	  to	  
engage	  in	  research	  and	  development	  and	  in	  trade	  and	  investment.	  .	  .”);	  GATT	  Secretariat,	  Meeting	  
of	  Negotiating	  Group	  of	  2,	  4	  and	  5	  April	  1990,	  MTN.GNG/NG11/20,	  para.	  4	  (Apr.	  24,	  1990)	  (citing	  a	  
representative	  of	  the	  EC	  explaining	  that	  the	  EC	  proposal	  attempted	  to	  address	  “the	  substance	  of	  
the	   problem	   of	   the	   potential	   for	   trade	   distortion	   if	   undisclosed	   information	   of	   commercial	   im-­‐
portance	   was	   not	   adequately	   protected	   under	   domestic	   law”);	   Meeting	   of	   Negotiating	   Group,	  
supra	  note	  49,	  para.	  11	  (Jun.	  22,	  1990)	  (citing	  a	  representative	  of	  the	  United	  States	  commenting	  
on	  the	  U.S.	  draft	  proposal	  that	  “it	  did	  not	  seek	  to	  harmonise	   legislations	  .	  .	  .	   	   it	   tried	  to	  create	  an	  
agreed	   level	  of	  obligations	  with	   respect	   to	   those	  aspects	  of	   intellectual	  property	   regimes	  which	  
had	  led	  to	  the	  greatest	  trade	  distortions”	  (emphases	  added).).	  
	   76.	   	  Initially,	   draft	   proposals	   were	   comprised	   under	   the	   heading	   “Government	   Use”	   (see	  
Chairman’s	  Report,	  supra	  note	  44,	  at	  42).	  
	   77.	   	  For	   an	   account	   of	   lobbying	   campaigns	   of	   the	   pharmaceutical	   industry	   in	   setting	   the	  
TRIPS	  agenda,	  see	  generally	  Robert	  Weissman,	  A	  Long,	  Strange	  TRIPS:	  The	  Pharmaceutical	  Indus-­‐
try	  Drive	  to	  Harmonize	  Global	   Intellectual	  Property	  Rules,	  and	  the	  Remaining	  WTO	  Legal	  Alterna-­‐
tives	  Available	  to	  Third	  World	  Countries,	  U.	  17	  	  PA.	  J.	  INT’L	  ECON.	  L.	  1069	  (1996).	  
	   78.	   	  With	   regard	   to	   the	  position	  of	   India,	   see	  Meeting	  of	  Negotiating	  Group,	   supra	   note	  40,	  
para.	  90;	  with	  regard	  to	  the	  position	  of	  Canada,	  see	  Meeting	  of	  Negotiating	  Group,	  supra	  note	  41,,	  
at	   15	   (reporting	   that	   the	   Canadian	   delegation	   “considered	   that	   the	   TRIPS	   negotiations	   were	  
perhaps	  not	  the	  appropriate	  forum	  to	  deal	  with	  concerns	  in	  respect	  of	  government	  use	  of	  trade	  
secrets”.).	  
	   79.	   	  THE	   WORLD	   TRADE	   ORGANIZATION,	   WORLD	   TRADE	   REPORT	   2004:.	   EXPLORING	   THE	   LINKAGE	  
BETWEEN	  THE	  DOMESTIC	  POLICY	  ENVIRONMENT	  AND	  INTERNATIONAL	  TRADE	  153	  (2004)	  (defining	  regula-­‐
tory	  barriers	  as	  government	  policies	  that	  control	  entry	  into	  industry	  or	  a	  particular	  market;	  the	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However,	   in	  many	   jurisdictions	  drug	   authorities	   approve	   the	   ge-­‐
neric	   versions	   of	   originator	   drugs	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   bioequivalence,80	  
whereby	   a	   generic	   applicant	   needs	   to	   submit	   evidence	   attesting	   that	  
the	  drug	  is	  therapeutically	  equivalent	  to	  and	  interchangeable	  with	  the	  
originator’s	   product.	   For	   that,	   there	   is	   no	   need	   to	   conduct	   full-­‐scale	  
clinical	   trials—the	  health	  authority	  can	   issue	  marketing	  authorization	  
based	  on	  the	  clinical	  trial	  results	  of	  the	  innovator	  company.	  
From	   the	  healthcare	  perspective,	   policy	  measures	   facilitating	   ge-­‐
neric	  competition	  are	  justified	  on	  public	  health	  grounds—i.e.,	  to	  secure	  
the	   greater	   availability	   and	   affordability	   of	   drugs.	   From	   the	   market	  
perspective,	  such	  provisions	  under	  drug	  regulation	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  state	  
intervention	   that	   can	  distort	   the	  market	  by	   “artificially”	   changing	   the	  
competition	  conditions.81	  
Since	  a	  generic	  competitor	  can	  bring	  the	  product	  to	  the	  market	  at	  
a	   fraction	  of	   the	  originator’s	   expenditures,	   it	   can	  be	   sold	  by	   the	   com-­‐
petitor	  at	  a	  fraction	  of	  the	  originator’s	  price.	  Once	  a	  generic	  product	  is	  
launched,	  the	  originator	  can	  no	  longer	  compete	  on	  product	  differentia-­‐
tion,82	  	  while	  competition	  on	  price	  impairs	  its	  ability	  to	  earn	  a	  “fair	  rate	  
of	  return”	  on	  investments.	  
Vested	   with	   the	   function	   of	   granting	   marketing	   authorization,	   a	  
drug	  authority	  in	  this	  situation	  plays	  the	  role	  of	  “gatekeeper”,	  de	  facto	  
regulating	   competition	   and	   the	  market.	  However,	   it	   differentiates	  be-­‐
	  
definition	  also	  includes	  cases	  when	  “acquisition	  of	  a	  permit	  may	  be	  allowed,	  but	  the	  cost	  of	  doing	  
so	  may	  be	  prohibitive”).	  
	   80.	   	  See	   IFPMA,	  supra	  note	  1,	  at	  7	  (defining	  that	  “[b]ioequivalency	  between	  a	  generic	  and	  a	  
pioneer	   drug	   is	   demonstrated	   by	   the	   bioavailability	   of	   the	   two	   products.	   Bioavailability	   is	   the	  
extent	  and	  rate	  at	  which	  the	  body	  absorbs	  the	  drug.	  Scientists	  measure	  the	  time	  it	  takes	  the	  ge-­‐
neric	  drug	  to	  reach	  the	  bloodstream.	  The	  generic	  drug	  must	  deliver	  the	  same	  amount	  of	  the	  active	  
ingredient	  in	  the	  same	  time	  period	  as	  the	  pioneer	  drug	  in	  order	  to	  be	  bioequivalent.”).	  	  
	   81.	   	  Jochen	  Gloeckner,	  The	  Law	  Against	  Unfair	  Competition	  and	  the	  EC	  Treaty,	  in	  LAW	  AGAINST	  
UNFAIR	   COMPETITION.	   TOWARDS	   A	   NEW	   PARADIGM	   IN	   EUROPE?	   77,	   79	   (Josef	   Drexl	   et	   al.,	   eds,	   2007)	  
(stating	   that	   the	   “concept	  of	   “distortion”	  .	  .	  .	   comprises	  not	  only	  direct	   interventions	   in	   the	   free-­‐
dom	  of	  activity	  of	  the	  market	  participants	  involved	  in	  or	  affected	  by	  anticompetitive	  practices,	  but	  
also	   other	   “artificial”	   changes	   of	   competitive	   conditions”.);	   CARL	   MICHAEL	   VON	   QUITZOW,	   STATE	  
MEASURES	  DISTORTING	  FREE	  COMPETITION	  IN	  THE	  EC,	  at	  44,	  216	  (2002)	  (defining	  passive	  distortion	  of	  
competition	  as	   the	   “category	  of	  State	  measures	  which	  affect	  market	  conditions”	  and	  set	  market	  
prerequisites	   that	   “affect	   the	   opportunities	   to	   carry	   out	   certain	   activities	  .	  .	  .	   to	   compete	   with	  
economic	   operators	   already	   existing	   in	   the	  market”	   as	   distinguished	   from	   active	   distortions	   of	  
competition,	  i.e.,	  direct	  state	  interference	  in	  the	  market.”).	  
	   82.	   	  European	   Medicines	   Agency,	   Questions	   and	   Answers	   on	   Generic	   Medicines,	  
EMA/393905/2006	  Rev.	  2,	  at	  1	  (Nov.	  22,	  2012)	  (defining	  generic	  medicine	  as	  “medicine	  that	   is	  
developed	  to	  be	   the	  same	  as	  a	  medicine	   that	  has	  already	  been	  authorised	  (the	   ‘reference	  medi-­‐
cine’).	  A	  generic	  medicine	  contains	  the	  same	  active	  substance(s)	  as	  the	  reference	  medicine,	  and	  it	  
is	  used	  at	  the	  same	  dose(s)	  to	  treat	  the	  same	  disease(s)	  as	  the	  reference	  medicine.”);	  see	  also	  THE	  
WORLD	  HEALTH	  ORGANIZATION,	  MARKETING	  AUTHORIZATION	  OF	  PHARMACEUTICAL	  PRODUCTS	  WITH	  SPECIAL	  
REFERENCE	   TO	   MULTISOURCE	   (GENERIC)	   PRODUCTS:	   A	   MANUAL	   FOR	   DRUG	   REGULATORY	   AUTHORITIES,	  
Regulatory	   Support	   Series	   No.	   005	   (1998)	   (defining	   a	   “generic	   product”	   as	   a	   pharmaceutical	  
product	  “intended	  to	  be	  interchangeable	  with	  the	  innovator	  product”.).	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tween	  competitors	  and	  it	  distributes	  the	  burden	  of	  compliance	  uneven-­‐
ly—while	  some	  traders	  need	  to	  bear	  the	  full	  costs	  of	  conducting	  clini-­‐
cal	   trials,	   others	   are	   granted	   a	   relief.	   Such	   relief	   can	   be	   seen	   as	   a	  
specific	  form	  of	  state	  aid	  in	  a	  sense	  that	  a	  public	  authority	  favors	  cer-­‐
tain	  undertakings	  and	  goods,	  and,	  as	  a	  result,	  “a	  business	  that	  benefits	  
from	  such	  aid	  thus	  enjoys	  an	  advantage	  over	  its	  competitors”.83	  
Thus,	  the	  particular	  “harm”	  for	  which	  the	  remedy	  was	  sought	  can	  
be	  seen	  in	  the	  distorting	  effect	  of	  state	  intervention	  that	  can	  cause	  “dif-­‐
ferences	  in	  the	  prerequisites	  to	  compete”.84	  	  From	  the	  originator’s	  per-­‐
spective,	   the	   practice	   a	   drug	   authority	   can	   be	   seen	   as	   particularly	  
unfair	   because	   the	   originator’s	   assets	   are	   used	   to	   aid	   the	   efforts	   of	  
competitors	   and	   result	   in	   putting	   the	   former	   at	   a	   competitive	   disad-­‐
vantage.	  
In	   this	   sense,	  protection	  under	  39.3	  differs	   from	  39.2	  TRIPS	   that	  
applies	   to	   the	   competitors’	   practices.	   In	   the	   case	   of	   the	   abbreviated	  
approval	  of	  a	  generic	  drug,	  the	  originator’s	   loss	  of	  market	  share	  upon	  
the	   generic	   entry	   is	   offset	   by	   the	   competitor’s	   gain;	   however,	   the	   re-­‐
dress	   cannot	   be	   claimed	   from	   the	   latter	   because	   a	   generic	   company	  
itself	   does	   not	   use	   the	   originator’s	   data.	  While	   protection	   under	   39.2	  
TRIPS	   is	   directed	   at	   fairness	   of	   the	  means	   of	   competition,	   protection	  
under	  39.3	   is	  directed	  at	   fairness	  of	  competition	  as	  an	   institution,	   i.e.,	  
the	  “order	  of	  struggle”	  that	  is	  “upheld	  by	  rules	  which	  ensure	  that	  each	  
trader	  succeeds	  through	  his	  own	  unaided	  efforts,	  and	  not	  through	  the	  
gaining	  of	  an	  advantage	  at	  the	  expense	  of	  an	  opponent”.85	  
Admittedly,	   protection	   against	   competitive	   inequalities	   arising	  
due	  to	  state	  regulation	  might	  not	  be	  the	  core	  function	  of	  unfair	  compe-­‐
tition	  law;	  it	  is	  certainly	  not	  within	  those	  practices	  explicitly	  outlawed	  
under	  10bis	  PC	  as	  minimum	  protection.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  unfair	  com-­‐
petition	  law	  has	  a	  potential	  to	  encompass	  within	  its	  ambit	  the	  regula-­‐
	  
	   83.	   	  The	   European	   Union,	   Summaries	   of	   EU	   legislation,	   Glossary	   available	   at	  
http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/glossary/state_aid_en.htm	   (last	   visited	   Feb.	   10,	   2015)	  
(defining	  state	  aid	  as	   “action	  by	  a	   (national,	   regional	  or	   local)	  public	  authority,	  using	  public	   re-­‐
sources,	  to	  favour	  certain	  undertakings	  or	  the	  production	  of	  certain	  goods.	  A	  business	  that	  bene-­‐
fits	  from	  such	  aid	  thus	  enjoys	  an	  advantage	  over	  its	  competitors.	  Control	  of	  state	  aids	  thus	  reflects	  
the	  need	   to	  maintain	   free	  and	   fair	   competition	  within	   the	  European	  Union.”).	   In	   the	  case	  of	   the	  
abbreviated	   generic	   approval,	   a	   peculiar	   trait	   is	   that	   a	   drug	   authority	   does	   not	   use	   “public	   re-­‐
sources”	  to	  facilitate	  generic	  competition	  but	  the	  originator’s	  private	  assets.	  
	   84.	   	  Quitzow,	   supra	   note	   81,	   at	   5	   (distinguishing	   between	   the	   notions	   of	   “distortion”	   and	  
“restriction”	  of	  competition,	  i.e.:	  “Whilst	  a	  ‘restriction’	  is	  an	  effect	  of	  a	  conduct,	  a	  distortion	  occurs	  
due	  to	  differences	  in	  the	  prerequisites	  to	  compete	  or	  measures	  which	  create	  such	  differences.”).	  
	   85.	   	  Sam	   Ricketson,	   Reaping	   without	   Sowing:	   Unfair	   Competition	   and	   Intellectual	   Property	  
Rights	  in	  Anglo-­‐Australian	  Law,	  7	  U.N.S.W.L.J.	  1,	  3	  (1984).	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tion	  of	  the	  relationships	  between	  the	  state	  and	  the	  private	  sector	  when	  
the	  former	  can	  impact	  competition	  in	  the	  market.86	  
Perhaps	  it	  would	  be	  a	  stretch	  to	  assume	  that,	  at	  the	  time	  of	  the	  ne-­‐
gotiations,	   the	  drafters	  had	  an	  elaborate	  concept	  of	  how	  the	   interface	  
between	   regulatory	   data	   protection	   and	   unfair	   competition	   law	   was	  
supposed	  to	  work	   for	   the	  purpose	  of	  data	  protection.	  The	   level	  of	  so-­‐
phistication	  in	  intellectual	  property	  matters	  alone	  differed	  to	  an	  extent	  
that	   some	   negotiators	   admitted	   that	   they	   “were	   not	   clear	   as	   to	  what	  
were	   the	   trade-­‐related	   aspects	   of	   intellectual	   property	   rights”.87	   The	  
hypothesis	  here	  is	  that	  the	  only	  competition-­‐related	  instrument	  under	  
international	   law	   that	   could	   be	   applied	   to	   remedy	   a	   potentially	   dis-­‐
torting	   effect	   of	   drug	   regulation	   on	   competition	   and	   trade	  was	   10bis	  
PC.	   	   Given	   nearly	   a	   hundred-­‐year	   difference	   between	   the	   two	   provi-­‐
sions,88	  their	  collocation	  might	  not	  be	  the	  perfect	  match.	  
Notably,	  it	  was	  the	  EC	  that	  proposed	  to	  collocate	  the	  protection	  of	  
undisclosed	   information	   with	   the	   repression	   of	   unfair	   competition.89	  
By	   the	   time	   of	   TRIPS	   negotiations,	   the	   EC	   already	   had	   experience	   in	  
protecting	  fair	  competition	  against	  market	  distortions	  in	  the	  context	  of	  
intercommunity	  trade.	  The	  Preamble	  and	  Article	  3	  (1)	  (f)	  of	  the	  Treaty	  
of	  Rome	  of	   1957	   (at	   present	  Article	  3	   (1)	   (g))	   can	  be	   recalled	   in	   this	  
regard	   that	   required	   the	   EC	   member	   states	   to	   “guarantee	   balanced	  
trade	  and	  fair	  competition”	  and	  institute	  a	  system	  “ensuring	  that	  com-­‐
petition	  in	  the	  common	  market	  is	  not	  distorted”.	  These	  provisions	  have	  
	  
	   86.	   	  See	  Handler,	  supra	  note	  36,	  at	  178	  (stating	  “the	  plane	  of	  competition	  is	  determined	  not	  
only	  by	  the	  horizontal	  controversies	  among	  competitors	  but	  also	  by	  the	  vertical	  conflicts	  between	  
seller	   and	   buyer	   and	   by	   the	   restraints	   imposed	   and	   enforced	   by	   the	   state.”);	   GUSTAVO	   GHIDINI,	  
WELFARE	   IN	   INTELLECTUAL	   PROPERTY	   LAW	   240–241	   (2010)	   (observing	   that	   “the	   initially	   supple-­‐
mental	  role	  played	  by	  unfair	  competition	  law	  has	  positively	  evolved,	  going	  from	  being	  a	  doctrine	  
at	  the	  service	  of	  exclusionary	  rights	  of	  intangible	  assets	  and	  goodwill	  to	  one	  that	  is	  at	  the	  service	  
of	  an	  open	  market.	  [.	  .	  .]Therefore,	  the	  overall	  interpretative	  and	  legislative	  developments	  .	  .	  .	  seem	  
to	  herald	  a	  new	  perspective	  that	  attributes	  to	  unfair	  competition	  law	  a	  scope	  that	  goes	  beyond	  the	  
mere	   boundaries	   of	   the	   private	   individual	   business	   interests	   directly	   involved	   in	   competition	  
disputes.”).	  
	   87.	   	  GATT	  Secretariat,	  Meeting	  of	  25	  March	  1987,	  MTN.GNG/NG11/1,	  para.	  6	  (Apr.	  10,	  1987);	  
see	   also	  Wadlow,	   supra	   note	   18,	   at	   31	   (stating	   that	   “the	  majority	   of	   the	   delegates	   at	   the	  TRIPs	  
negotiations	   were	   extremely	   unsophisticated	   in	   their	   understanding	   of	   intellectual	   property	  
rights	  and	  the	  existing	  international	  regimes,	  and	  that	  the	  briefing	  materials	  provided	  by	  WIPO	  on	  
confidential	  information,	  regulatory	  data,	  and	  unfair	  competition	  were	  almost	  non-­‐existent”).	  
	   88.	   	  Article	   10bis	   was	   introduced	   into	   Paris	   Convention	   upon	   the	   Revision	   Conference	   of	  
Brussels	  in	  1900.	  (Bodenhausen,	  supra	  note	  36,	  at	  142).	  
	   89.	   	  Notably,	   the	   US	   regarded	   its	   proposal	   for	   protection	   of	   trade	   secrets	   under	   property	  
rights	   in	   line	  with	  10bis	  PC.	  See	  Meeting	  of	  Negotiating	  Group,	   supra	  note	  49,	  para.	  12	   (citing	  a	  
representative	  of	  the	  United	  States	  stating	  “[r]egarding	  acts	  contrary	  to	  honest	  commercial	  prac-­‐
tices	  including	  protection	  of	  trade	  secrets,	  the	  [US]	  proposal	  attempted	  to	  provide	  greater	  preci-­‐
sion	  to	  Article	  10bis	  of	  the	  Paris	  Convention”	  (emphasis	  added).).	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been	  interpreted	  as	  incorporating	  the	  antitrust	  and	  unfair	  competition	  
branches	  of	  competition	  law.90	  
Thus,	  the	  special	  purpose	  of	  39.3	  TRIPS	  can	  be	  seen	  in	  protecting	  
the	   commercial	   interests	  of	   the	  originator	   companies	  against	   the	  dis-­‐
torting	  effect	  of	  drug	  regulation	  on	  competition.	  However,	  it	  is	  not	  the	  
equality	   of	   competitive	   conditions	   that	   is	   the	   ultimate	   concern	   and	  
objective	  of	  39.3	  TRIPS.	  The	  main	  object	  of	  protection	  of	  the	  provision	  
is	   not	   the	   repression	   of	   unfair	   competition,	   but	   the	   data	   themselves.	  
Such	  subordination	  arises	  from	  the	  prevailing	  type	  of	  legal	  protection.	  
D.	  39.3	  TRIPS	  as	  an	  overlap	  between	  trade	  secret,	  unfair	  competi-­‐
tion,	  and	  sui	  generis	  data	  protection	  
From	   the	   legislative	   perspective,	   39.3	   TRIPS	   presents	   a	   peculiar	  
case	   of	   intentional	   overlap	   between	   trade	   secret,	   unfair	   competition,	  
and	  sui	  generis	  types	  of	  protection.	  
The	  heading	   of	   the	  provision	  points	   out	   the	   trade	   secret	   regime.	  
However,	   among	   the	   two	   types	   of	   protection	   stipulated	   under	   39.3	  
TRIPS,	  protection	  against	  disclosure	  is	  rather	  a	  supplementary	  obliga-­‐
tion	   (as	   emphasized	   by	   the	   conjunction	   “In	   addition.	  .	  .”).	   Being	   the	  
primary	  obligation,	  39.3	  TRIPS	  requires	  the	  protection	  of	  data	  against	  
specific—”unfair	  commercial”—uses.91	  
The	   collocation	   of	   unfair	   competition	   and	   IP	   types	   of	   protection	  
does	  not	  appear	  as	  something	  artificial	  or	  extraordinary.	  The	  two	  legal	  
regimes	  are	  inherently	  related.	  In	  the	  words	  of	  Professor	  Ladas,	  unfair	  
competition	   law	   “forms	   the	   background,	   and	   constitutes	   the	   general	  
principle	  of	  which	   the	   laws	  protecting	   the	  various	  branches	  of	   indus-­‐
trial	  property”	  and	  aims	  at	  protecting	  the	  same	  interests	  as	  specialized	  
branches	   of	   industrial	   property,	   i.e.,	   “interests	   acquired	   by	   lawful	   ef-­‐
forts,	  research,	  labor,	  investment	  or	  by	  conducting	  a	  lawful	  business”.92	  
	  
	   90.	   	  See	  Reto	  M.	  Hilty,	  The	  Law	  Against	  Unfair	  Competition	  and	  Its	  Interfaces,	  in	  LAW	  AGAINST	  
UNFAIR	  COMPETITION.	  TOWARDS	  A	  NEW	  PARADIGM	  IN	  EUROPE?	  1,	  11–12	  (Josef	  Drexl	  et	  al.,	  eds,	  2007)	  
(stating	  that	  the	  “prevailing	  interpretation	  is	  that	  [Art.	  3	  Para.	  1	  (g)	  EC]	  is	  primarily	  aimed	  at	  the	  
legal	  activity	  of	  the	  Community	  in	  the	  field	  of	  antitrust	  law.	  However,	  if	  one	  includes	  the	  pream-­‐
ble,	   paragraph	  5	  of	  which	  also	   requires	   “fair	   competition”	   to	  be	  guaranteed,	   there	   is	  no	   reason	  
why	  the	  completely	  open-­‐ended	  wording	  of	  Art.	  3	  Para.	  1	  (g)	  EC	  should	  not	  also	  be	  understood	  as	  
being	  aimed	  at	  the	  law	  against	  unfair	  competition.”);	  Gloeckner,	  supra	  note	  81,	  at	  77–78	  (“Admit-­‐
tedly	  competition	  is	  primarily	  protected	  by	  means	  of	  the	  rules	  on	  competition	  in	  Art.	  81	  et	  seq.	  EC.	  
Nevertheless	   Art.	   3	   Para.	   1	   (g)	   requires	   not	   only	   measures	   against	   classical	   infringements	   of	  
Antitrust	  law	  but	  also	  against	  unfair	  competition	  if	  the	  infringement	  is	  capable	  of	  interfering	  with	  
the	  functions	  of	  competition.”).	  
	   91.	   	  See	  Carvalho,	  supra	  note	  39,	  para.	  39.137	  (referring	  to	  protection	  against	  data	  disclosure	  
“as	   adjective	   protection”	   and	   protection	   against	   uncompensated	   reliance	   on	   data	   for	   generic	  
approval	  as	  “substantive	  protection”	  under	  39.3	  TRIPS).	  	  
	   92.	   	  See	  LADAS,	  supra	  note	  36,	  at	  1675–1676.	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Furthermore,	  some	  specific	   IP	  rights	  evolved	   from	  unfair	  competition	  
domain—the	  legislative	  precedents	  of	  neighboring	  rights	  and	  sui	  gene-­‐
ris	  protection	  of	  databases	  can	  be	  invoked	  in	  this	  regard.93	  
However,	  39.3	  TRIPS	  does	  not	  grant	  a	  new	  IP	  right	  in	  the	  meaning	  
of	  protection	  against	  all,	  but	  rather	  provides	  for	  the	  sui	  generis	  type	  of	  
data	   protection.	   Yet,	   in	   some	  way,	   it	   appears	   similar	   to	   IP	   right:	   alt-­‐
hough	   protection	   is	   not	   granted	   in	   the	   form	   of	   an	   exclusive	   right,	   it	  
intends	  to	  achieve	  an	  exclusionary	  effect—to	  preclude	  particular,	  albe-­‐
it	  vaguely	  defined,	  uses	  of	  test	  data.	  In	  this	  sense,	  the	  protection	  of	  test	  
data	  is	  in	  line	  with	  the	  concept	  of	  negative	  rights	  under	  IP	  law.94	  
There	  is,	  at	  least,	  a	  formal	  distinction	  between	  unfair	  competition	  
and	   IP	   law	  as	  providing	  conduct-­‐oriented	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	   object-­‐related	  pro-­‐
tection.95	   The	   wording	   of	   the	   provision	   suggests	   that	   the	   sui	   generis	  
type	  of	  protection	  is	  prevalent:	  although	  protection	  is	  directed	  at	  par-­‐
ticular	  practices	  that	  constitute	  unfair	  commercial	  use,	  the	  focus	  is	  on	  
the	  data	   themselves	   (“[m]embers.	  .	  .shall	   protect.	  .	  .data	   against	  unfair	  
commercial	  use”).	  This	  suggests	  that	  fairness	  and	  equality	  of	  competi-­‐
tive	  conditions	  are	  rather	  a	  secondary	  concern;	  the	  main	  purpose	  is	  to	  
protect	  the	  achievement	  in	  data	  generation.96	  
The	  qualification	  criterion	  of	  considerable	  effort	   involved	   in	  data	  
generation	   emphasizes	   the	   investment	   rationale	   for	   protection.	   The	  
requirement	   of	   the	   utilization	   of	   new	   chemical	   entities	   suggests	   that	  
protection	   is	   intended	   to	   reward	  achievements	   that	   significantly	   con-­‐
tribute	  to	  innovation.	  Thus,	  the	  purpose	  of	  data	  protection	  under	  39.3	  
TRIPS	   is	   two-­‐fold:	   to	  provide	   for	   investment	  amortization,	   and	   to	  en-­‐
	  
	   93.	   	  See	  Annette	  Kur,	  What	  to	  Protect,	  and	  How?	  Unfair	  Competition,	  Intellectual	  Property,	  or	  
Protection	   Sui	   Generis,	   MAX	   PLANCK	   INSTITUTE	   FOR	   INTELLECTUAL	   PROPERTY	   AND	   COMPETITION	   LAW	  
RESEARCH	  PAPER	  SERIES	  No.	  13–12,	  at	  8–10	  (2013)	  (accounting	  for	  protection	  under	  unfair	  compe-­‐
tition	  when	  it	  “served	  as	  an	  ‘incubator’	  for	  new	  types	  of	  rights,	  or	  where	  it	  has	  led	  to	  an	  extension	  
of	  existing	  IPRs	  to	  new	  areas	  or	  objects	  of	  protection.”).	  
	   94.	   	  See	  Panel	  Reports,	  European	  Communities	  –	  Protection	  of	  Trademarks	  and	  Geographical	  
Indications	  for	  Agricultural	  Products	  and	  Foodstuffs,	  WT/DS174/R,	  para.	  7.210	  and	  WT/DS290/R,	  
para.	  7.246	  (stating	  that	  the	  “principles	  [under	  Article	  8.1	  of	  the	  TRIPS	  Agreement]	  reflect	  the	  fact	  
that	  the	  TRIPS	  Agreement	  does	  not	  generally	  provide	  for	  the	  grant	  of	  positive	  rights	  to	  exploit	  or	  
use	  certain	  subject	  matter,	  but	  rather	  provides	  for	  the	  grant	  of	  negative	  rights	  to	  prevent	  certain	  
acts.	   This	   fundamental	   feature	   of	   intellectual	   property	   protection	   inherently	   grants	   Members	  
freedom	  to	  pursue	  legitimate	  public	  policy	  objectives.”).	  
	   95.	   	  See,	  e.g.,	  ESTELLE	  DERCLAYEDERCLAVE,	  THE	  LEGAL	  PROTECTION	  OF	  DATABASES.	  A	  COMPARATIVE	  
ANALYSIS	   251	   (2008)	   (distinguishing	   between	   unfair	   competition	   and	   IP	   on	   the	   basis	   that	   the	  
former	  defines	  specific	  subject	  matter	  of	  protection	  while	  the	  latter	  protects	  against	  the	  competi-­‐
tor’s	  unfair	  behavior);	  Kur,	  supra	  note	  93,	  at	  8	  (arguing	  that	  the	  distinction	  between	  intellectual	  
property	   and	   unfair	   competition	   law	   as	   object-­‐	   and	   conduct-­‐related	   protection	   appears	   “as	   a	  
matter	  of	  pure	  semantics,	  or	  rather	  of	  perspective”.).	  
	   96.	   	  Kur,	  supra	  note	  93,	  at	  6	   (arguing	   that	   the	   “basic	  axiom	   is	   that	  unfair	  competition	  does	  
not	  provide	  any	  basis	  for	  protecting	  valuable	  achievements,	  i.e.,	  it	  is	  not	  object-­‐oriented,	  but	  only	  
concerns	  the	  evaluation	  of	  conduct”.).	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courage	  continuing	  innovative	  activity.	  In	  that,	  data	  protection	  reflects	  
the	   logic	   underlying	   patent	   protection	   that	   is	   based	   on	   the	   idea	   that	  
legal	  monopoly	  of	   patent	   rights	   allows	   for	   the	  ex-­‐post	   recovery	  of	   in-­‐
vestment	  and	  motivates	  ex	  ante	  to	  undertake	  further	  R&D	  activity.	  
E.	  The	  principle	  
In	   view	  of	   these	   considerations,	   the	   principle	   underlying	   protec-­‐
tion	  under	  39.3	  TRIPS	  can	  be	  defined	  as	  follows:	  the	  use	  of	  data	  consti-­‐
tutes	  “unfair	  commercial	  use”	  and	  shall	  be	  prevented	  when	  excluding	  
others	  from	  such	  use	   is	  the	  only	  means	  for	  the	  originator	  to	  amortize	  
investment	  in	  data	  generation.	  In	  other	  words,	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  a	  third	  
party’s	   use	   of	   data	   shall	   be	   evaluated	  with	   regard	   to	   its	   effect	   on	   the	  
originator’s	   capacity	   to	   innovate—i.e.,	   protection	   should	   be	   accorded	  
when	  such	  use	  interferes	  with	  the	  originator’s	  ability	  to	  recover	  costs	  
incurred	   in	   the	   generation	   of	   the	   original	   dataset	   to	   an	   extent	   that	   it	  
erodes	  the	  incentive	  to	  undertake	  further	  inventive	  activity.97	  
Under	   this	   principle,	   compliance	   with	   the	   obligation	   under	   39	  
TRIPS	   is	   rather	   a	   question	   of	   finding	   the	   proper	   means	   to	   structure	  
protection	   that	  would	   allow	   the	   originator	   to	   amortize	   investment	   in	  
data	  generation.	  At	   this	  point,	  one	  may	  ask:	  what	  uses	  of	  data	  realize	  
the	  investment	  amortization	  function	  of	  test	  data?	  Apart	  from	  generic	  
approval,	  what	  other	  uses	  can	  possibly	   interfere	  with	   the	  originator’s	  
ability	   to	   earn	   returns	   on	   investment?	   Are	   the	   clinical	   trial	   data	   “ex-­‐
ploited”	  as	  an	  asset	  in	  the	  course	  of	  commercial	  activities	  after	  obtain-­‐
ing	  marketing	   authorization,	   in	   the	   sense	   that,	   when	   a	   competitor	   is	  
excluded	  from	  such	  use,	  the	  originator	  can	  charge	  higher	  prices?	  
A	  better	  understanding	  of	  the	  economic	  value	  of	  clinical	  data	  upon	  
marketing	  approval,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  means	  of	  its	  realization	  is	  needed	  in	  
order	  to	  conceive	  the	  appropriate	  legal	  rules.	  At	  the	  outset,	  it	  appears	  
implausible	  to	  correlate	  legal	  protection	  with	  the	  measure	  of	  compen-­‐
sation	  R&D	  expenditures	  for	  each	  drug	  on	  an	  individual	  basis,	  especial-­‐
ly	   in	   view	   of	   the	   global	   pharmaceutical	   trade.	   To	   a	   great	   extent,	   the	  
actual	  return	  on	  investment	  can	  depend	  on	  the	  particular	  market	  con-­‐
ditions.	  One	  drug	  can	  earn	  different	  profits	  from	  sales	  in	  different	  mar-­‐
kets,	   even	   if	   those	   jurisdictions	   provide	   identical	   provisions	   on	   data	  
	  
	   97.	   	  As	  observed	  by	  Professor	  Reichman,	   if	   unjust	   enrichment	   is	   included	   “within	   the	  pur-­‐
view	  of	  its	  domestic	  unfair	  competition	  law	  .	  .	  .	  	  courts	  could	  consider	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  allowing	  
regulatory	   approval	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   bioequivalence,	   without	   more,	   destroyed	   any	   incentive	   to	  
generate	  the	  data	  needed	  to	  bring	  the	  product	  to	  market	  as	  well	  as	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  that	  incen-­‐
tive	  had	  been	  amply	  sustained	  in	  the	  country	  of	  origin	  (or	  other	  relevant	  countries)”(Reichman,	  
supra	  note	  57,	  at	  20)..)	  
550	   CHICAGO-­‐KENT	  JOURNAL	  OF	  INTELLECTUAL	  PROPERTY	   [Vol	  14:2	  
protection.	  On	   the	  other	  hand,	   in	  one	  and	   the	  same	  market,	  one	  drug	  
can	  generate	  profits	  that	  would	  be	  a	  “fair	  return”	  on	  R&D	  investment,	  
while	  another	  might	  not.98	  
The	   unfeasibility	   to	   adjust	   protection	   based	   on	   the	   ex-­‐ante	   as-­‐
sessment	   of	   the	   amount	   of	   compensation	   does	   not	   mean	   that	   some	  
form	  of	  ex-­‐post	  investment	  recovery	  should	  not	  be	  guaranteed	  at	  all.	  At	  
the	   same	   time,	   the	   boundary	   of	   legal	   protection	   should	   be	   set	   not	   to	  
preclude	  the	  uses	  of	  data	  that	  do	  not	  negatively	  impact	  the	  originator’s	  
sales	  from	  the	  drug,	  for	  which	  the	  initial	  dataset	  was	  generated.	  
F.	  Implications	  for	  data	  disclosure	  for	  experimental	  purposes	  
According	  to	  the	  stated	  principle,	  the	  experimental	  use	  of	  regula-­‐
tory	  data	  shall	  not	  constitute	  unfair	  commercial	  use	  within	  the	  mean-­‐
ing	  of	  Article	  39.3	  TRIPS,	  insofar	  as	  it	  does	  not	  impede	  the	  originator’s	  
ability	   to	   recoup	   investment	   into	   data	   generation.	   Such	   an	   impeding	  
effect	   is	   unlikely	   since	   the	   development	   and	   commercialization	   of	   a	  
new	   product	   resulting	   from	   the	   enabled	   experimental	   use	  would	   re-­‐
quire	   time.	  The	  new	  product	  might	  not	  be	   in	  direct	   competition	  with	  
the	  one	  for	  which	  the	  original	  dataset	  was	  produced.99	  
The	  question	  arises	  with	  regard	  to	  the	  scope	  of	  protection:	  should	  
protection	  be	  confined	  to	  the	  profits	  derived	  from	  the	  sales	  of	  the	  ref-­‐
erenced	   drug,	   or	   should	   the	   originator	   be	   entitled	   to	   potential	   bene-­‐
fits100	   including	   possible	   inventions	   	   that	   might	   “lay	   dormant”	   in	  
clinical	   trial	   data	   and	   not	   yet	   be	   realized	   in	   the	  marketed	   drug?	   The	  
motivation	   of	   data	   originators	   to	   restrict	   access	   to	   data	   for	   experi-­‐
mental	   use	   is	   understandable:	   it	   would	   be	   practically	   impossible	   to	  
prove	  that	  a	  competitor’s	  new	  product	  resulted	  from	  the	  experimental	  
use	  of	  the	  originator’s	  data.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  as	  a	  non-­‐rivalrous	  good,	  
clinical	   trial	   data	   can	   be	   used	   for	   experimentation	   by	   different	   re-­‐
	  
	   98.	   	  Suzanne	  Scotchmer,	  The	  Political	  Economy	  of	  Intellectual	  Property	  Treaties,	  20	  J.L.	  ECON.	  
&	  ORG.	  415,	  422	  (2004)	  (noting	  that	  “for	  some	  subject	  matter,	  protection	  in	  any	  one	  of	  the	  large	  
markets,	  the	  United	  States,	  Europe,	  or	  Japan,	  is	  enough	  to	  compensate	  an	  inventor,	  regardless	  of	  
where	  the	  inventor	  is	  domiciled”).	  
	   99.	   	  See	   John	  P.	  Dawson,	  The	   Self-­‐Serving	   Intermeddler,	   87	   (7)	  HARVARD	   LAW	  REVIEW,	   1409,	  
1416	  (1974)	  (arguing	  that	  the	  “principalprinciple	  purpose	   in	  controlling	   free	  riders	  was	  to	  pre-­‐
vent	  one	  competitor	  profiting	  from	  the	  investment	  .	  .	  .	  	  of	  another	  competitor	  in	  situations	  where	  
both	  of	  them	  competedcompete	  directly”.).	  
	   100.	   	  As	  originally	  proposed	  by	  the	  United	  States,	  “[t]rade	  secrets	  submitted	  to	  governments	  
as	  a	  requirement	  to	  do	  business	  shall	  not	  be	  disclosed	  except	  in	  extreme	  circumstances	  involving	  
national	   emergencies	   or,	   in	   the	   case	   of	   public	   health	   and	   safety,	   provided	   that	   such	   disclosure	  
does	  not	  impair	  actual	  or	  potential	  markets	  of	  the	  submitter	  or	  the	  value	  of	  the	  submitted	  trade	  
secrets”	  (emphasis	  added).	  )Suggestion	  by	  the	  United	  States,	  supra	  note	  47,	  at	  8.	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searchers	   at	   the	   same	   time	   and,	   at	   least	   theoretically,	   lead	   to	   inde-­‐
pendent	  inventions.	  
Policies	  enabling	  regulatory	  data	  disclosure	  for	  experimental	  pur-­‐
poses	  can	  be	  justified	  under	  the	  overall	  objectives	  of	  the	  TRIPS	  Agree-­‐
ment.	   Access	   to	   clinical	   trial	   data	   by	   the	   research	   community	   can	  
prevent	   conducting	   duplicative	   trials101	   and	   avoid	   the	   needless	   expo-­‐
sure	   of	   human	   subjects	   to	   trial	   risks,	   whereas	   restrained	   access	   and	  
monopoly	   type	   protection	   can	   lead	   to	   the	   underutilization	   of	   clinical	  
trial	  data	  and	   the	   internalization	  of	  positive	  externalities.	  Benefits	   for	  
healthcare	  improvement	  associated	  with	  the	  broader	  access	  to	  regula-­‐
tory	  data	  can	  “contribute	  to	  the	  promotion	  of	  technological	  innovation	  
and	   to	   the	   transfer	   and	   dissemination	   of	   technology”,102	   whereas	   ac-­‐
cess	  to	  data	  by	  other	  researchers	  can	  promote	  the	  allocative	  efficiency	  
of	   resources	   and	  be	   seen	   as	   a	  measure	   “necessary	  .	  .	  .	   to	   promote	   the	  
public	   interest	   in	   sectors	   of	   vital	   importance	   to	   [the]	   socio-­‐economic	  
and	  technological	  development”103	  as	  aspired	  by	  the	  goals	  and	  princi-­‐
ples	  of	   the	  TRIPS	  Agreement.	   In	   this	   sense,	   policy	  measures	   enabling	  
access	  to	  clinical	  data	  are	  in	  line	  with	  the	  WTO	  concept	  of	  policy	  coher-­‐
ence.104	  
CONCLUSION	  
Admittedly,	  the	  definition	  of	  the	  minimum	  protection	  requirement	  
under	  39.3	  TRIPS	   leaves	  room	  for	  speculation.	  The	   three	  readings	  of-­‐
fered	   in	   this	   article	   show	   that	   the	   protection	   obligation	   shall	   not	   be	  
interpreted	  as	  precluding	  any	  seemingly	  unfair	  use	  of	  data,	  even	  when	  
it	   is	   exercised	   by	   competitors	   with	   commercial	   intent	   and	   generates	  
commercial	  benefits.	  
Beyond	  the	  core	  area	  of	  unfair	  competition—acts	  associated	  with	  
dishonest	  practices—protection	  against	  unfair	  commercial	  use	  should	  
not	  be	  interpreted	  as	  the	  prohibition	  of	  a	  specific	  act	  as	  such	  but	  rather	  
	  
	   101.	   	  Bryan	   C.	   Mercurio,	   TRIPS-­‐Plus	   Provisions	   in	   FTAs:	   Recent	   Trends,	   REGIONAL	   TRADE	  
AGREEMENTS	  AND	  THE	  WTO	  LEGAL	  SYSTEM	  215,	  227	  (Lorand	  Bartels	  &	  Frederico	  Ortino,	  eds,	  2006)	  
(stating	  that	  “duplication	  of	  testing	  is	  arguably	  unethical,	  as	  it	  simply	  is	  repetition	  in	  testing	  and	  
clinical	   trials	   where	   the	   safety	   and	   efficacy	   of	   a	   product	   has	   already	   been	   determined”);	   also	  
Carvalho,	   supra	   note	   18,	   para.	   39.143	   (stating	   that	   “exclusive	   protection	   of	   test	   data	   leads	   to	  
waste	  of	  scarce	  resources,	  because	  it	  requires	  competitors	  to	  repeat	  the	  same	  test	  on	  a	  product	  
that	  is	  known	  [and]	  leads	  to	  the	  re-­‐invention	  of	  the	  wheel”).	  
	   102.	   	  TRIPS	  Agreement	  art.	  7,	  Jan.	  1,	  1995.	  
	   103.	   	  TRIPS	  Agreement	  art.	  8,	  Jan.	  1,	  1995.	  
	   104.	   	  The	  WTO,	   supra	   note	  79,	   at	  151	   (emphasizing	  efficiency	   in	   resource	  allocation	  as	   “the	  
prism	   through	   which	   [the	   WTO]	   view[s]	   coherence	   in	   trade,	   competition	   and	   environmental	  
policies”).	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be	  based	  on	  the	  appraisal	  of	  particular	  circumstances.105	  Since	  the	  sui	  
generis—IP-­‐type—of	   data	   protection	   prevails	   in	   39.3	   TRIPS,	   the	   pro-­‐
tection	  should	  be	  confined	  to	  situations	  when	   its	  absence	   impairs	   the	  
innovator’s	   capacity	   and	   motivation	   to	   engage	   in	   further	   innovative	  
activity.	   As	   long	   as	   the	   experimental	   use	   of	   data	   does	   not	   offset	   the	  
profits	  from	  the	  drug,	  for	  which	  the	  initial	  dataset	  was	  generated,	  poli-­‐
cies	   that	   enable	   the	   disclosure	   of	   trial	   reports	   for	   experimental	   use	  
shall	  not	  be	  considered	  to	  violate	  39.3	  TRIPS.	  
Specialized	  branches	  of	   IP	   law	  delineate	   legal	  protection	  and	  de-­‐
fine	   conditions,	   when	   the	   protected	   subject	  matter	   enters	   the	   public	  
domain	  and	  when	  its	  use	  by	  others	  is	  legitimate.	  In	  view	  of	  the	  growing	  
importance	   of	   data	   protection	   in	   the	   biopharmaceutical	   sector,106	   the	  
need	  for	  such	  delineation	  would	  be	  highly	  appreciable	  a	  it	  would	  con-­‐
tribute	  to	  legal	  certainty	  and	  support	  innovative	  activity	  in	  the	  sector.	  
Restrained	  access	   to	   clinical	  data	   as	  well	   as	   greater	  data-­‐sharing	  
can	   cause	   multiple	   effects	   on	   innovative	   activity	   by	   different	   actors.	  
The	  further	  analysis	  of	  the	  scientific	  and	  economic	  value	  of	  regulatory	  
data	  would	  yield	  a	  better	  understanding	  of	  the	  costs	  and	  benefits	  asso-­‐
ciated	   with	   restricted	   access	   to	   data	   as	   well	   as	   their	   disclosurer	   for	  
experimental	  use.	  Such	  analysis	  would	  be	  necessary	   to	   inform	  policy-­‐




	   105.	   	  See	   Ansgar	   Ohly,	  Reverse	   Engineering:	   Unfair	   Competition	   or	   Catalyst	   for	   Innovation?,?	  
PATENTS	  AND	  TECHNOLOGICAL	  PROGRESS	  IN	  A	  GLOBALIZED	  WORLD	  535,	  552	  (W.	  Prinz	  zu	  Waldeck	  und	  
Pyrmont	  et	  al.,	  eds,	  2009)	  (concluding	  with	  regard	  to	  unfair	  competition,	  trade	  secret	  protection	  
and	  reverse-­‐engineering	  that	  “[t]here	  should	  be	  no	  general	  presumption	  that	  obtaining	  a	  secret	  
outside	  relations	  of	  confidence	  is	  unfair	  as	  such.	  Rather,	  the	  broad	  notion	  of	  “fairness”	  or	  “honest	  
practices”	  allows	  a	  balancing	  exercise	  which	  takes	  into	  account	  the	  interests	  of	  the	  owner	  of	  the	  
information	  of	  the	  person	  interested	  in	  obtaining	  it	  and	  of	  the	  general	  public.”).	  
	   106.	   	  Yaniv	  Heled,	  PatentsParents	  vs.	  Statutory	  Exclusivities	  in	  Biological	  Pharmaceuticals—Do	  
We	  Really	  Need	  Both?,	  18	  MICH.	  TELECOMM.	  TECH.	  L.	  REV.	  419,	  424	  (2012)	  (questioning	  whether	  “the	  
statutory	  exclusivity	  regime	  in	  biologics	  [could]	  mark	  the	  dawn	  of	  a	  new	  era	  in	  the	  protection	  and	  
incentivizing	  of	   innovation	  and	  the	  beginning	  of	  a	  gradual	  replacement	  of	  the	  old	  patent	  system	  
with	   modern	   schemes	   of	   statutory	   exclusivities;	   or	   is	   it	   just	   a	   peculiar	   case	   of	   a	   legal	   regime	  
shaped	  by	  an	  unusually	  powerful	  industry”).	  
